By Captain Robert D. Moore, Infantry

THE ATTACK ON 19 NOVEMBER cntnd.

So far only seven men had been lost due to artillery fire. No casualties from small arms fire had been suffered.

The change in direction which amounted to a ninety degree turn to the right was made and the advance continued.

After proceeding for about 300 yards the patrols reported they had arrived at the edge of a space in the woods that obviously had been recently cleared. The column was halted and the Company Commander and the 1st Platoon Leader moved forward to join the patrols. Upon arriving at the edge of the clearing they found it to be almost a perfect square. It extended for about 250 yards on each side. The felled trees had been removed and, as we later learned, had been used in fortiflcations. The limbs that had been trimmed from the trees were left in the clearing. Although this square was only approximately 250 yards across, no evidence of fortification on the far side could be seen even though field glasses were used in searching the area.

The Company Commander felt so strongly that this must be a heavily defended area he decided to make preparations to launch a major attack even though as yet no enemy had been seen. Accordingly he ordered one patrol to reconnoitre the right flank of the position and the other patrol to reconnoitre the left flank. All platoon leaders, attached and assigned, and the Field Artillery and mortar observers were brought forward. All were shown the area. The greatest stealth was used. Both patrols returned and reported finding an extensive trench system on each flank of the position. This confirmed the Company Commander's opinion that this was a strongly fortified position, and he determined to throw everything in the first assault in an attempt to avoid being repulsed,

The platoon leaders were withdrawn, and the attack order was issued. The order was substantially as follows:

1. The 1st Platoon, Company C, would move to the left flank and attack generally astride the trenches.
2. The 2nd Platoon, Company C, would swing around to the right in order to get in a position parallel to the trench system which made up the far side of the clearing. It would then attack astride those trenches and join with the 1st Platoon at the far left comer of the square.
3. The 3rd Platoon, would move down the right side of the square to protect that flank of the Company and be prepared to assist the 2nd Platoon.
4. The attached heavy machine gun platoon from positions in the 1st Platoon area would support the attack of the 1st Platoon and be prepared to support the attack of the 2nd Platoon. It would fire until:

   a. Its fires were masked by the 1st Platoon;
   b. ordered to stop by the Company Commander, Company C;
   c. on red star signal from the 2nd Platoon.

   (This platoon’s fire was not expected to be very effective since it could not secure positions at the very edge of the clearing and the forest was so thick that from positions just a few feet inside it the fields of fire were very limited.)
5. The platoon of tank destroyers and the remaining two medium tanks would move into position where they could fire directly across the clearing. All of the weapons on the tanks would be fired. This fire would be lifted under the same conditions as stated for the heavy machine gun platoon.
6. The light tanks would move directly across the clearing until they arrived at the far edge where they would continue firing Into the woods. This fire would be lifted under the same conditions as the fire of the heavy machine gun platoon. (The reasons for the light tanks advancing was due to so little being known about the clearing that it was felt they might be needed to advance beyond the clearing, and the forest on the far side of the clearing looked of such nature that it was doubted medium tanks would be able to advance.)
7. The light machine guns the weapons platoon were to remain with the platoons they were presently attached to.
8. The 60 mm mortar section was to go into position at the last firebreak passed and fire on the far edge of the clearing.
9. The fire of all supporting weapons would begin three minutes prior to the jump-off and would continue under the conditions imposed except the 60 mm mortar section which would cease firing at the end of the three minutes.
10. The artillery and mortar observers would call for fire on the battalion objective since their close support could not be given to the attack.
11. The engineer squad would remain in the immediate vicinity of the medium tanks.
12. The Company Executive Officer, with a SCR 300 radio, would remain with the platoon leader of the medium tank platoon in order that radio communication could be maintained between the tank platoon leader and the company commander.
13. All fires were to begin on the order of the Company Commander, Company C, and the attack was to proceed as planned thereafter. (See Map D)

So far all the plans and preparations had been made more on a "hunch” of the Commanding Officer of Company C than on any information concerning the enemy.

All units moved into position. It was now about 1230 hours. The Company C Commander stood up to make a final check and picked up the hand set of the radio to inform the Battalion Commander that the attack was about to be launched when suddenly the air apparently became saturated with small arms and high angle fire. Rifle fire, machine gun fire, artillery up to 170 mm, and mortar fire ranging from 60 mm to 150 mm fell on Company C. Never had this veteran company experienced such sudden overwhelming fire. It was nearly unbelievable that so perfect timing of such devastating fire could be achieved. The company commander's radio operator was severely wounded and the radio destroyed by small arms fire. The 2d Platoon Leader and the Weapons Platoon Leader were severely wounded. The number of other personnel wounded is unknown. There was no cover anywhere from the rain of death. The enemy mortar and artillery shells striking and exploding in the tree tops were particularly effective since they were air bursts and no man could find shelter from the shell fragments. The company was temporarily completely disorganized.

The Company Commander, Company C, immediately decided the only thing to do was attack as soon as control was regained.

The Executive Officer was ordered to take command of the 2d Platoon, but it was soon evident that he had been too badly shaken by the concentrations to do so. He was then relieved of this duty and ordered to supervise the evacuation of the wounded and see that no man evaded combat by leaving the area. The Platoon Sergeants of the 2d Platoon and Weapons Platoon were ordered to assume command of those platoons. A SCR 300 radio was obtained from the Weapons Platoon and contact was reestablished with the Battalion C. P. The reorganization required approximately one half hour. This reorganisation was made extremely difficult due to the constant intense concentrations of high angle fire and the small arms fire that blanketed the area.

Just before the attack was to be resumed a P-47 started strafing what at first appeared to be the area occupied by the 1st Platoon, Company C, but then was seen to be actually the opposite side of the clearing. This was only 250 yards in front of Company C.

The three minute preparation was ordered begun and while this was being fired the P-47 made another attack, and then just as the preparation ended it made its last attack. No prior planning could have coordinated such perfect support from the Air Corps.

The attack jumped off. The 2d Platoon had not advanced more than fifty yards when the platoon leader reported the platoon was encountering bunkers dug into the ground, automatic weapons positions, and Individual riflemen. He was ordered to press the attack and to pass on by the bunkers leaving only one or two men to guard each until the 3d Platoon could arrive to clean them out. The 1st Platoon reported encountering well dug-in positions but that those positions were being slowly overcome. The platoon of light tanks had moved out and was advancing slowly across the clearing. Enemy bazookas started firing but were extremely inaccurate, probably due to such heavy fire being placed on the enemy positions that the gunners could not accurately aim their weapons. The Company Commander then moved forward with the 3rd Platoon. The 1st Sergeant was ordered to remain with the tank platoon leader instead of the Executive Officer, who was busy with the last duties assigned to him. Again the lack of direct communication with the tank platoon leader was proving annoying. The 3rd Platoon arrived in rear of the 2d Platoon and started clearing out the bunkers. The light tanks were stopped about fifty yards short of their objective, the edge of the clearing, by a maze of barb wire attached to short stakes. Since they were more or less "sitting ducks" in that position they were ordered to return across the clearing. All Infantry elements of the company moved slowly forward. Fierce fighting took place in each platoon area. Many hand grenades were used and practically all of the fighting was done at ranges under 25 yards. At last the 1st Platoon reported it had fought its way to the corner of the square where the 2d Platoon was to join it. The 1st Platoon was ordered to remain in position since any further advance would have exposed it to the fires of the 2d Platoon. Shortly thereafter the 2d Platoon advanced sufficiently so that the fire of the tanks was lifted. The heavy machine gun platoon had ceased firing before this. The 2d Platoon then fought its way to a junction with the 1st Platoon. In the meantime the 3rd Platoon completed its mopping up mission. Immediate consolidation and reorganization was begun.

In the attack on the clearing twenty five Germans were captured and fifteen were killed. Every German captured had been wounded as the enemy had resisted to the utmost. (35)

It was now 1630 hours. It was evident that due to the complete reorganization necessary Company C would be unable to advance further that day due to the approaching darkness. The Battalion Commander was informed of the status of Company C.

A check revealed that in the days action Company C had lost two officers and sixty three men; the heavy machine gun platoon lost ten men; the engineer squad had lost one man.

There had been no personnel lost in the tank or tank destroyer platoons while three medium tanks had been knocked out by mines.

All three rifle platoons were placed on line on two sides of the square facing the enemy. The 60 mm mortar section and the amor were ordered to remain in position. The heavy machine gun platoon was brought across the clearing and disposed in squads along the front occupied by Company C.

Upon closer inspection of the position just captured it was found the majority of the trenches and bunkers had been constructed about five yards inside the forest from the edge of the clearing. The bunkers had been constructed so that they extended about three feet above and below the ground. The sides were made of only single large logs, but the roofs were three alternating layers of large logs and dirt. Some of the bunkers were as much as forty feet long and fifteen feet wide. All had beds made of laced rope and straw mattresses for the occupants.

Had aerial photographs of this area been available the existence of this clearing would have been known, and plans could have been made before hand for its capture. Time and personnel might have been saved if the location of this clearing had been known.

Immediately in rear of the trenches and bunkers the forest became very dense. The large pine trees were so close together that tanks could not move any further in that direction.

A small patrol was sent to the front to determine the location of the next German position. Another small patrol was sent to the right to see if tanks could be taken forward in that direction. The first patrol returned and reported the dense pines extended about 100 yards and then gave way to large hardwood trees. This was about 250 yards from the 1st Battalion and Company objective. The patrol leader stated that as he emerged from the pines he was fired upon by an automatic weapon from the direction of the objective. A short while later the second patrol returned and reported that the dense forest extended so far to the right that tanks would be unable to advance in that direction. All of this information was given to the Battalion Commander by radio.

All of the water, ammunition, and food that had been carried on the tanks was brought forward to the positions presently occupied. The 1st Platoon was ordered to establish one listening post at the edge of the thick pines.

Almost immediately after Company C had captured the clearing, high angle fire started falling within the area. While daylight lasted this fire was intense, and throughout the night harassing fire continued.

All day Companies A and B had followed C Company by bounds, and although they had not participated in the attack they had suffered severe casualties from mortar and artillery fire.

Just before dark these companies moved forward and joined Company C. At this time Company C consolidated its position so that it occupied only the trenches on the side of the square that faced northeast. Company A moved to the left and Company B to the right of Company C and extended and joined so as to form a perimeter defense of the square.

It was rapidly getting dark and still many wounded lay where they had been hit. Some were unable to move due to the nature of their wounds while others were immobile due to shock. The litter carry now involved a one way distance of about 1800 yards. About 500 yards was through known or suspected minefields that had only been marked by the tank tracks. As yet this path had not been widened or marked by Battalion. Litter teams therefore were restricted to the tank tracks in moving through that area. Litter team casualties had been caused by mortar and artillery fire, and It was soon evident that all the wounded could not be evacuated from the battlefield that night. All companies began searching for the wounded and brought them to the bunkers where they could at least have shelter and receive first aid. This search went on far into the night since the moans of the wounded led searches to them. The litter teams continued working throughout the night, but in spite of their tremendous efforts all of the wounded were not evacuated by morning.

The night was intensely cold, and even though it had not rained during the day the ground was so wet that the clothing of the men had been soaked through when they had been forced to crawl. No bedrolls were available since none had been carried and all efforts were being directed towards the evacuation of the wounded. Perhaps the greatest discomfort was caused by wet cold combat boots and though each man carried an extra pair of socks there was no way of drying the pair taken off. All personnel were rotated so that each man spent part of the night in the bunkers. During this time he was required to remove his boots and rub his feet so that circulation would be restored.

Throughout the day no other unit in the Regiment had actually attacked the enemy.

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