(4TH INF. DIV.) IN THE ATTACK OF THE HURTGEN FOREST,
GERMANY, 19-21 NOVEMBER 1944
(RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
By Captain Robert D. Moore, Infantry
THE ATTACK ON 19 NOVEMBER
... and the leading medium tank started forward. At this time the tank destroyers shifted to firing machine guns at the flanks of the point where the breach was to be made. Companies A and B and the heavy machine gun platoon began firing as scheduled.
As the tank reached the edge of the minefield the explosion of anti-personnel mines under its tracks could be heard. All were nearly breathless as it reached the wire barrier and nosed into it. The tank was momentarily stopped, but with a great roar of motors it backed up and then charged the barrier again. It was through. Just then one of its tracks was blown off by the explosion of an anti-tank mine.
During this time only occasional mortar and artillery fire had been falling on the barrier. As supposed then it was later learned from prisoners that when the assembled armor had arrived the enemy had withdrawn and for some unknown reason had failed to shoot concentrations of artillery and mortars on the position.
As soon as the lead tank had passed through the wire the attack continued as planned. The next tank in column bypassed the knocked out tank and then cut to the left to get on the left side of the firebreak. The passage of the barrier proceeded as planned.
The progress of the medium tanks was slowed in order to let the light tanks come abreast. When this was accomplished the attack proceeded as rapidly as possible. The attack had progressed about 300 yards when three things happened almost simultaneously:
- A call was received from the Company Executive Officer stating the entire company had cleared the barrier without the loss of a single man.
- The leading medium tank was knocked out by a land mine. Fortunately, there were no casualties within or without the tank. In fact, the tankers seemed quite happy as they came out of the tank.
- A concentration of artillery fell on the column. The column halted because the tanks halted. The medium tank platoon leader was contacted by radio and ordered to continue the advance. The next medium tank pulled around the knocked out tank and the infantry which had been following the lead tank fell in behind it. There could still be heard the occasional pop of an anti-personnel mine under the tanks so the original formation was maintained.
The advance continued about 200 yards farther when the first fire break running perpendicular to the line of advance was sighted. The Company Commander attempted to contact the medium tank platoon leader by radio, but could not do so. He then attempted to use the telephone on the outside of the platoon leaders tank, but it too was out of order. Contact was then established by him climbing on the tank and getting the turret open. Contact by wire or radio was never reestablished throughout the operation. This was to make adequate control of the tanks very difficult. The column was finally halted just short of the firebreak. The engineer squad was called forward and ordered to sweep the firebreak. They did this under the protection of the riflemen and tanks and reported there were no mines in the road.
A patrol consisting of one squad from each column was then ordered to precede the column at the limit of visibility. Flank security was also sent out. This was the first time the Company Commander of Company C had felt he could take these actions without excessive loss from mines.
The column then started its advance again. Contrary to the reports of the engineer squad the firebreak did have antitank mines in it. Again the lead medium tank was lost due to hitting a land mine. The Engineer Squad Leader said it had been a plastic mine and the sweeper would not pick it up. A passage across the road was then probed and the advance continued.
Just after the firebreak was crossed a firefight involving the two lead patrols broke out and concentrations of mortars and artillery fire started falling on the column. The column was halted and the Company Commander and the 1st Platoon Leader moved forward to determine the situation. They found the two patrols firing on three well camouflaged positions. The lead medium tank and the lead light tank were moved forward and the two patrols and tanks together advanced on the positions. The positions were overrun. Two Germans were captured and three were found dead. The remainder had been able to withdraw due to the excellent selection of their positions and the restricted visibility.
The advance continued and the second firebreak which ran perpendicular to the route of advance was crossed without incident .
The majority of the column had crossed this firebreak when the patrols reported they were about 50 yards from the main road that constituted the initial objective of the Company and that tanks could not cross the road. This was due to a small stream that ran close and parallel to the near side of the road and the abrupt rise of the ground from the stream to the road. The presence of this stream had previously been unknown. The patrol further reported that an abatis covered the road for more than a hundred feet and that seven or eight German soldiers had been seen. This information was verified. Wire had not been able to keep up with the advance, but constant contact had been maintained with Battalion CP by radio. The Battalion Commander was informed of the situation, and permission to change the route of advance and proceed directly to the final objective was obtained.
It was approximately 1100 hours. The advance had covered about 1,000 yards. There was about 1,000 yards left to go.
