By Captain Robert D. Moore, Infantry

THE ATTACK ON 20 NOVEMBER

During the night telephone communication with the Battalion CP was established. Shortly before daybreak the Company Commander of C Company received an order by telephone from the Battalion Commander that the battalion would attack again at 0900 hours in the same order as the previous day. No close support mortar or artillery fire would be available since there was such great danger of the rounds striking the tall trees overhead. The objective was to be the same as the final objective of the previous day.

The plan of attack of Company C was generally as follows:

1. The 1st and 3d Platoons would attack abreast, with the 3d platoon on the right.
2. The 2d Platoon would follow in rear of the 1st Platoon.
3. The light machine gun section would be attached to the 3d Platoon.
4. The heavy machine gun platoon (which, in the course of its reorganization had dwindled to a section) would be attached to the 1st Platoon.
5. All of the armor would remain in its present location.
6. The 60 mm mortar section would move into the clearing and be prepared to deliver fire on the objective on call.
7. Company Headquarters would remain in its present location until ordered to displace.
8. The engineer squad would remain with the Company Headquarters and be prepared to use demolitions if the company encountered a minefield.
9. The artillery and mortar observers were ordered to request fire on the roads in rear of the objective.
10. The direction of the attack would be due east.
11. The line of departure would be the trenches now occupied by Company C. (See Map D)

After daybreak the reorganization of the company was checked again, and it was found that four men had been wounded during the night. This left a total strength of 3 officers and 98 men remaining in Company C.

A message was received from battalion that the minefield had finally been cleared and additional litter teams were being employed.

Since daybreak the enemy artillery and mortar concentrations had steadily increased in intensity and by 0830 hours seldom did a period as long as five minutes go by without a concentration falling on the clearing. Evacuation of the wounded or any other movement was made difficult.

At 0900 hours Company C moved out of its trenches. The company had not moved fifty yards when concentrations of mortar and artillery fell in its very center. It began to appear as if the enemy had some supernatural being directing its fire since it was so accurate. Again the tree bursts of the high angle fire exacted a heavy toll. The company pushed steadily forward and upon arrival at the edge of the thick pines the two leading platoons sent scouts farther ahead, deployed more, and then moved into the hardwood forest. Visibility here was as much as 100 yards in some directions.

Shortly after leaving the thick pines the high angle fire decreased in intensity since the slight slope of the ground caused the artillery shells to,pass on overhead.

The company had moved about 100 yards from the edge of the thick pines and the scouts were only about 50 yards from the objective when suddenly the enemy opened fire with machine guns, rifles, bazookas and a direct fire weapon. The scouts were all killed or wounded and several casualties were sustained in each of the leading platoons. The Company was halted. Although several enemy machine guns were firing only two could be definitely located. Bazookas and rifle grenades were brought forward to fire on these positions. The majority of the rounds fired by the bazookas failed to go off due to landing short and striking soft ground. One machine gun position was silenced. The rifle grenades were of little value since a direct hit could not be scored with them.

The two leading platoons were ordered to move forward by fire and movement. This was to be done with all squads abreast. This advance was attempted and did not gain more than a few yards at the cost of several casualties among which was the Platoon Leader of the 1st Platoon. The company was stopped again.

The Executive Officer was called forward to take command of one of the platoons. Just as he joined the Company Commander a mortar round burst in the tree over them, and the executive officer had to be evacuated. The only officer left was the Company Commander.

The 1st Platoon did not have a platoon sergeant or platoon guide since both had been wounded on the first day. The Platoon Guide of the 3d Platoon was placed in command of the 1st Platoon. It was impossible to maneuver to the left since a machine gun from an unlocated position was sweeping the ground in that area. The 2d Platoon was ordered into a position on the right flank of the company. When it was in position the 60 mm mortar section was ordered to fire on the objective even though some rounds might fall short. As soon as the mortar section started firing another attack was launched and again the attack was stopped. Seemingly the fire of the 60 mm mortar section had no effect as more casualties were sustained. It was now about 1400 hours.

The Battalion Commander had been kept informed of the situation all day and was now informed that Company C had been completely stopped.

Neither Company A nor Company B had moved throughout the day. About 1430 hours Company A was ordered to attack on the left of Company C and Company B was ordered to attack on the right. Company C was ordered to join in the attack.

Shortly after Company A moved out of its position and got one squad on the high ground across the road on the left flank of the battalion the "supernatural" fire of the enemy was explained. A well dug-in camouflaged enemy artillery observation post was captured.

Both Company A and Company B launched their attack, but neither ever got abreast of Company C. Company C was unable to move.

Just before dark Company C withdrew approximately fifty yards where better positions could be occupied. This was far enough back down the hill to allow the men to move around stooped over and thereby not be hit by small arms fire. In the most advanced positions it had been impossible to even rise to one's knees without becoming an immediate target for the enemy small arms fire.

The results of the days action were:

1. Company C had advanced only about 150 yards.
2. Many casualties had been suffered.
3. It could not be definitely established that a single enemy had been killed or wounded and none had been captured.

The need for reorganization was great as the total noncommissioned officer strength remaining in the forward area was the 1st Sergeant, the Weapons Platoon Sergeant, one Platoon Guide, three Rifle Squad Leaders, and one Light Machine Gun Squad Leader. The light machine gun section consisted of a squad leader and two men. Company Headquarters was reduced to the 1st Sergeant and a radio operator. (This did not include the Supply Sergeant, Mess Sergeant and six cooks) The 60 mm mortar section had remaining the Weapon Platoon Sergeant and six men. It was determined that forty men were present in the forward area. It was then decided to temporarily disband the 60 mm mortar section since they could not furnish close-in support in this particular area. Two men of this section were assigned to the light machine gun section in order that both guns of that section could be manned. The remaining four men became riflemen. The remaining riflemen were consolidated into two platoons. The only platoon guide remaining was placed in command of one, and the Weapons Platoon Sergeant commanded the other. Therefore, one platoon had sixteen men and the other had seventeen. The light machine gun section had five men. During the days fighting two officers and fifty men had become casualties.

The heavy machine gun platoon was reduced to eight men.

The Platoon Leader of this platoon was returned to the bunkers in the clearing since any further action on his part would have resulted in another casualty due to combat fatigue.

While this reorganization was being made an order was received directing the detachment of the engineer squad and the armor and their return to the Battalion C. P. immediately. The Battalion C. P. had moved to a location near the rock quarries. These units left to report to the new location at once.

All of the wounded were evacuated prior to darkness, but it was not possible to remove the dead.

The shortage of ammunition which existed in the company was taken care of by the Supply Sergeant arid the mess personnel acting as carrying teams during the night.

The company was disposed for the night in a single approximately straight line that extended from a point near the road on the left flank for about 150 yards to the southeast.

The two heavy and two light machine guns were spaced equally along this line. Actual contact on the left flank was not made with Company A, but contact on the right flank with Company B was made. (See Map D)

The men started digging holes for the night but soon found that a hole not more than six inches deep could be dug until it started filling with water because the ground was water-soaked. The men had learned time and again during the past two days that shelter trenches dug in the woods were practically useless unless they could be covered with logs, and since this could not be done in this situation presently all attempts to dig ceased. Bed rolls were still not available since all efforts had been directed towards evacuation of the wounded and resupply of ammunition. Soon after dark it became bitterly cold, and as the clothing of all was water-soaked, the only way warmth could be obtained was through exercise. The night was spent in alternate periods of exercise and rest. No one was able to sleep. Again the most severe discomfort was caused by inadequate footwear. The only comfort during the night was that the majority of the enemy artillery rounds were passing overhead and landing to the rear. Only occasional mortar rounds fell on the position during the night. No order was received from Battalion.

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