in the Attack on pillbox sector at Wahlerscheid, Germany
(Heartbreak Crossroads) - 13 - 16 December 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
By Captain John A. Frye
CONCENTRATION AND PLANNING cntnd.
Recent enemy activity had been limited in the proposed zone of action. Patrol action had been meager, and artillery and mortar fire had been relatively light. In short, the Division G-2 report stated that this had been a quiet sector in contrast to the area north of Schmidt. (38)
- To defend his present positions stubbornly.
- To reinforce his troops in the Division zone.
- To defend in successive positions when forced to withdraw.
- To make local counterattacks against the flanks or rear of the penetration.
- To launch a major counterattack from the Gemünd-Schleiden area. (39)
These were all general conclusions, and no doubt the enemy would put each and all into effect when the time came. Ignorance of the enemy, his disposition and strength, weighed heavily upon the Battalion Command Party.
After more than two months of defensive combat In the Schnee Eifel Forest, where the Battalion fought the weather as well as the wary Germans, there was evidently formed or acquired a defensive psychology. This psychosis no doubt resulted from the fact that the Battalion had spent over two months constructing a defensive sector which it believed could not be breached. Therefore, it was hard to believe a sector of the Siegfried line would be held so lightly it could be overrun by doughboys armed with bayonets.
However, orders were to attack, so it was decided to throw all effort Into the element of surprise and give the best possible.
Friendly forces consisted of elements of the 99th Division, who were on the right flank, with the mission of protecting the 2nd Division right flank and attacking in conjunction with them. The 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, was on the left flank. All supporting fires were planned, but would not be fired except on order of the Battalion Commander through the Regimental Commander. (40)
The direction of the attack was parallel to the Krinkelt-Rocherath-Wahlerscheid Road. The line of departure was the present outpost line. The time of the attack was 0830, 13 December 1944. It was decided to maintain control visually with the 1st Battalion, on the left, through flank elements. Contacts on the right would be maintained by elements of the support platoon of the right leading assault company. (41)
Control, after crossing the line of departure, would be maintained by reports from leading elements when phase lines, designated by Regiment, were crossed. These phase lines were firebreaks and key terrain features, that could be easily recognized on the map, and should be picked up without difficulty on the ground. (42)
Formations and plan of attack were discussed quite freely. It was finally decided that two companies would be used, moving abreast, each company covering a 300 yard front. E Company, with the 1st Platoon of Heavy Machine Guns, the 2nd Platoon of the Regimental Antitank Company and one-half squad of the Battalion A & P Platoon attached, would be on the left, guiding on the Krinkelt-Rocherath-Wahlerscheid Road, G- Company, with the 2nd Platoon of Heavy Machine Guns, Battalion Antitank Platoon and one-half squad of the Battalion A & P Platoon attached, would be on the right, guiding on E Company. F Company, initially in Battalion Reserve, would follow G Company. H Company; the 1st Platoon would be attached to E Company, the 2nd Platoon attached to G Company and the 3rd, or Mortar, Platoon would support the Battalion from successive positions, displacing by section. The initial position was to be the present assembly area. From Headquarters Company, one-half squad of the A & P Platoon would be attached to each assault company to clear necessary paths through any obstacles encountered. The Battalion Antitank Platoon, with 2,36″ rockets, would be attached to G Company, The 2nd Platoon of the Regimental Anti-tank Company, with 2.36″ rockets, would be attached to E Company. All units would do whatever was necessary to maintain complete secrecy in order to gain complete surprise. (43)
In an area approximately 500 yards from the pillbox area combat packs and overcoats would be dropped. Bayonets would be fixed and all assault units checked. The assault elements would move out on order of the Battalion Commander to overrun and seize enemy installations within the zone of action, and kill or capture any enemy encountered.
Administrative details were left up to the Battalion Executive Officer, S-1, and S-4. They were taken up in detail at a later meeting. (44)
Radio silence would be in effect until contact with the enemy had been made. The Battalion Wire Team would follow the Command Party, laying W110 wire. Current S. 0. I. was in effect. (45)
This conference ended with the tentative plan made to issue the Battalion attack order at 1930, 12 December 1944, at the Battalion Command Post. In the meantime the Battalion Commander coordinate his plan with the Regimental Commander, Regimental S-3, Artillery Commander and adjacent Battalion Commanders. The Battalion S-3 would the Company Commanders prior to darkness on routes to the line of, the line of departure and direction of attack. The S-2 would a study of all available aerial photos, and contact adjacent units and for all additional enemy information and intelligence available. (46)
The Battalion closed in the forward area by 1600, 12 December, The Company Commanders were oriented by the Battalion S-3 prior to darkness. The Battalion Commander issued his order at 1930, 12 December, as planned.
The weather was warmer, temperature 30° F. The night was reasonably comfortable, for the woods were dense, there were several log huts in the area. These were used for shelters in which to warm the men and dry out clothing. Fir branches and limbs were used shelter and mats to sleep on.
