in the Attack on pillbox sector at Wahlerscheid, Germany
(Heartbreak Crossroads) - 13 - 16 December 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
By Captain John A. Frye
CONCENTRATION AND PLANNING cntnd.
The 2nd Battalion S-2 moved out shortly after receipt of the above stated orders, accompanied by the Battalion Ranger Squad, to contact elements of the 3rd Battalion, 395th Infantry Regiment, 99th Division, reported holding the present line. (23)
Members of the 2nd Battalion Staff, including the S-1 and quartering party, moved out early on the morning of 12 December. The S-1 selected a forward assembly area for the Battalion, approximately 2000 yards forward from the areas designated by Regiment. This new area was approved by Regiment. (24) (See Map B).
The Battalion Commander and S-3 contacted the 2nd Battalion S-2 at the Command Post of the 3rd Battalion, 395th Infantry Regiment. The S-2 had been in this vicinity since 11 December, sending out patrols and becoming acquainted with the general situation. (25)
Aerial photos were made available, and a brief reconnaissance was made by the Battalion Commander and S-3, led by the S-2. It was decided all plans would have to be made from maps and aerial photos because of the rugged, densely wooded terrain. (26)
A Command Post was established In a house in the area. Since there was no artillery and enemy contact was spasmodic, this was considered a safe place ana afforded shelter from the snow and 24° F. temperature. (27)
The road junction at Wahlerscheid controlled movement south, northwest and northeast from the Roer and Urft Dam areas. Therefore, in order to secure the vital dams of the Roer and Urft Rivers, it was necessary to control this road junction. (28)
This area was known to be a highly fortified pillbox sector of the Siegfried Line, but was believed to be lightly held by a poor quality troop. The present front was held by element of the 99th Division. Contact with the enemy was made only upon patrol action into the German Frontier, which was 4000 yards from the outpost line of the 99th Division. (29)
The terrain within the sector was almost all heavily wooded, affording cover and concealment for attacker and defender alike. The ground was practically level throughout the area. (30)
Fields of fire were limited within the woods, but numerous fire lanes and unimproved trails, in addition to the main roads through the sector, afforded excellent fields of fire. The trees were good impact areas for mortar and artillery fire, offering maximum opportunity for tree burst. (31)
Observation, likewise, was limited within the woods, but improved along roads and fire lanes. (32)
The Krinkelt-Rocherath-Wahlerscheid Road was an improved, metalled road, approximately 5.5 meters wide. Trails and fire lanes through the woods provided routes for foot traffic. (33)
Obstacles consisted of pillboxes, abatis, mines (antitank and antipersonnel), antitank ditches, and barbed wire. (double apron and concertina), in addition to 18 - 24 inch snow, with the ground beneath the snow only slightly frozen. The temperature ranged from 20-30° F. (34)
The majority of the man-made obstacles were in the vicinity of the road junction at Wehlerscheid (Wahlerscheid). However, the abatis were on the main road and many of the trails. These blocks were thoroughly mined and booby trapped. (35)
The pillboxes known to be in the area were of the usual fighting and observation type, mutually supporting, with troop shelter boxes within the area. No accurate location of the pillboxes was known. Patrols sent out to contact the enemy and reconnoiter for obstacles were unable to definitely locate the pillboxes. However, there was located a heavily mined and wired-in sector, with an antitank ditch in a cleared belt, approximately 300 yards south of the road junction. (36)
There followed two hours of discussion between the Battalion Commander, S-2, and S-3 concerning the plan of attack.
There was no detailed information on the German dispositions in this sector. The sector was reported thinly held by elements of the 277th Volksgrenadier Division. There were estimated to be three light battalions and one medium battalion of enemy artillery. There were no local reserves known. (37)
