in the Attack on pillbox sector at Wahlerscheid, Germany
(Heartbreak Crossroads) - 13 - 16 December 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
By Captain John A. Frye
THE ATTACK
After a hot breakfast the 2nd jumped off at 0830, 13 December 1944. Snow was falling and the seemed to be rising. Visibility was approximately 200 yards. The Battalion moved in silence under cover of the deep forest. In order to maintain the element of surprise, no artillery preparations were fired. (47)
As the men pressed through the covered fir branches, the rising temperature, together with body heat, melted the snow freely until it was almost like rain. After an hour everyone within the Battalion advance was drenched to the skin from head to foot. (48)
Since the line of departure was 4000 yards from any known enemy or suspected enemy installations, move was made in good order, formations well up and direction maintained through reports as each phase line was crossed. (49)
At 1115 lead scouts reported a fortified area. Each assault company was ordered to drop packs and fix bayonets. From observation points along the outer edge of the woods little could be seen. The area had considerable second growth and vegetation, all with snow. Several huge mounds, with trees growing on top of them, and a dense wall of trees to the rear could be observed. From two of these mounds smoke was seen to curl upward and be blown away in the gusty, raw wind. After a check from the Companies it was decided this was the fortified area; and the element of surprise was still being maintained, the Battalion Commander decided to move across the cleared area with the utmost speed. (50)
At 1200 the Battalion Commander ordered E and G Companies to move from the covered area of the forest as fast possible to overrun obstacles in view. Each company moved as directed, but immediately upon coming into the cleared area, they came under intense small fire. (51)
Progress was continued, but became slower as the men began to hit antipersonnel mines and wire, and light mortar started to fall. However, Captain Ross of F Company and Captain Force of G Company pushed their assault units forward with the utmost energy. E Company assault units, after moving through five separate rows of single apron barbed wire, finally became enmeshed in a field of barbed wire, antipersonnel mines, and concertina, G Company got elements of one platoon to the communication trench in their sector, but was stopped by intense small arms and mortar fire. The Battalion Commander, seeing the surprise falling through, contacted Captain Force personally, sending the S-3 to contact Captain Ross personally. The Company Commanders were instructed to move forward at once or all would be lost. However, the situation continued to get worse as more men hit antipersonnel mines, became enmeshed in barbed wire, and were hit by small arms and mortar fire. (52)
Artillery and heavy mortar fire started covering the area in tremendous volumes. From the intensity of the fire of all types, there was little doubt as to the fact that the enemy main positions had been hit and the enemy surprised. The violent reaction, by fire well directed from behind seemingly well fortified positions with good observation, threw the Battalion attack completely off balance. (53)
The Battalion Commander immediately called for fire on the suspected pillbox location and ordered the Battalion mortars to open up. The artillery and mortar fire was adjusted by forward observers, from positions within 100 to 200 yards of the pillboxes. However, area targets of suspected enemy installations were the best that could be gotten. The snow, along with the mined area and enemy fire, made movement of individuals extremely difficult. Despite the situation, five pillboxes were located, and artillery and mortar fire was laid on and around them. It was quite definite the fire was doing very little If any damage to the fortifications. (54)
Throughout the afternoon the main effort was in the G Company sector. There was some concealment due to the folds in the ground and a neck of woods that extended out into the clearing. Also, there seemed to be more undergrowth. The 1st Platoon of G Company, with a detachment from the Battalion A & P Platoon, with bangalore torpedoes and wire cutters, worked under the most severe conditions of weather and enemy fire to breach a sector of the wire. Several explosions from the bangalores were heard, and some progress was made, but it was extremely slow since the movement of the party had to be made by crawling. Just before dark contact was lost between the Platoon and the Company. Contact was not regained until after 2100 that night. It was reported that the party had been unable to get through the wire. While this effort was being made, the 2nd Platoon was attempting to find a route farther to the right, but was stopped in two attempts. (55)
E Company was practically helpless, with the entire company scattered through the cleared area, under intense artillery, mortar and small arms fire. Any attempt to move about was almost certain death. Many men were caught in the maze of wire and antipersonnel mine fields. Captain Ross was ordered to hold what he had and have the men dig in for protection.
Medics and litter bearers were sent in to get the wounded out. (56)
At 1900 Regiment ordered the Battalion to dig in and hold what they had for the night. The front line was approximately 100 yards from the line of pillboxes that could be identified more easily all the time. The artillery and mortar fire was beginning to defoliate numerous strong points. The snow had continued to melt throughout the day. Visibility was still poor; the maximum had been 500 yards around noon. (57)
During the day the 1st Battalion of the 9th Regiment, on the left, suffered an experience very similar to the 2nd Battalion. The unit of the 99th Division, on the right, succeeded in taking two pillboxes, but was unable to move farther.
