By Major John J Lavin

THE SITUATION BECOMES CRITICAL

By 0530 5 November the engineers had opened the MSR to KOMMERSCHEIDT but it still required considerable skill to negotiate. By 1000 hours six of the eight destroyers had reached the town. One had been immobilized by artillery fire in the draw and its crew was killed or captured by Germans on patrol. One had developed an oil leak and made it only to the edge of the woods north of the town, where it stopped for repairs. It took over four hours to negotiate some 2000 yards.

These guns arrived as the infantry was receiving its second counterattack of the day. The TD platoon leaders conferred with the tank platoon leader who had been there since the night of 3 November. His recommendations were accepted and the 1st platoon moved in positions west of the town with his 3 tanks and the 3rd Platoon moved east of town. The combined fire of the TDs, Tanks and Infantry broke up the counterattack.

This same morning at 0715 the situation in VOSSENACK was entirely befogged. The battalion commander and his operations officer while en-route to that town received a report from "B" Company that the infantry reported an enemy tank attack on the town. Shortly thereafter another report stated that 12 Tiger Tanks supported by infantry were approaching the town. 31 Still no report came from "B" Company indicating they were engaged. Upon arrival at the "B" Company CP at RICHELSKAUL at 0800 the battalion commander could find no evidence of a tank attack. Meanwhile the destroyers in town found the artillery and mortar fire the hottest they had ever encountered. It was necessary that they keep their radios on 24 hoars a day. This caused the batteries to weaken rapidly in the cold weather, and it was therefore necessary to charge them frequently using the two diesel motors which furnished power to move the destroyer. This attracted considerable fire to be directed at them, and much of it fell on the infantry. By noon each of the four TD's on the slope east of VOSSENACK had been hit four times, their infantry guide was killed and six crewmen wounded by fragments coming thru the open turrets. Equipment and stowage on the outside of the vehicle was being knocked off or torn to shreds. All platoons had similar experiences. They could only sit there and hope to spot one of the frequently reported enemy tanks, but no target appeared. 32

Over on the 'hill' (the nickname which was bestowed on KOMMERSCHEIDT) the enemy was growing stronger by the hour. He continued to blanket the area with artillery and direct fire, and made repeated counterattacks. During the day the third platoon leader and his crew were killed by an explosion, inside the turret, the first platoon leader was wounded as were a number of the crew men in both platoons. Four enemy tanks were reported knocked out. 33 By 1630 this day (5 November) the remaining two-gun platoon had been guided across the KALL River and was ordered into reserve positions north of KOMMERSCHEIDT. This platoon was further instructed to move into town, at dawn the following morning. 34

Shortly after dark, about 1730 hours the battalion commander received a message to report to the CP of the 707th Tank-Battalion, north of JAEGERHAUS. (See Map D) Here the battalion commanders of the 3d Battalion 110th Infantry, 707th Tank Battalion and 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion discussed the organization, of Task Force Ripple, so named since Lt. Colonel Ripple, the tank battalion commander, was in command.

Included in the force were the elements of "C" Company in the KOMMERSCHEIDT area and one platoon of "B" Company, in the VOSSENACK area which was to move across the draw with a supply column of the 112th Infantry about midnight, 5-6 November. 35

During each night all units engaged in a frantic effort to resupply, evacuate casualties, and bring up available replacements. It was during this night that the situation in the KALL valley along the MSR became even more critical. The "C" Company commander and his Reconnaissance platoon leader had returned to VOSSENACK early in the night 5-6 November to pick up ammunition and try to get immediate replacements for his two platoon leaders. The liaison officer with the 112th Infantry was assigned to "C" Company as a replacement and after they had secured the ammunition they moved to the head of the draw where a column of weasels (M-29 Cargo Carriers) and Jeeps were held up. When they heard an explosion they assumed the trail had been mined and returned to VOSSENACK to try early the next morning when the trail was cleared.

Actually German Combat Patrols had ambushed the infantry supply column and the engineer company. An aid station in the KALL valley was visited by enemy patrol members whom the aid men observed mining the trail. 36

In VOSSENACK "B" Company with recovery vehicle attempted to evacuate the destroyer which had fallen in a cellar. Unknown to them enemy heavy mortars had registered on the destroyer during the day and after they had dismounted and hooked up the destroyer and attempted to hoist it out, the sound of racing motors brought in a mortar concentration which seriously wounded the company motor sergeant and one mechanic. The destroyer was left in the cellar.

So it went daring the night while the battalion commander and his operations officer were at the division CP with Lt. Colonel Ripple coordinating and receiving final instructions relative to the task force that the supply route was not completely in our hands. This was the route to be used by the light tank company of the 707th Tank Battalion, the platoon of Tank Destroyers from "B" Company and the battalion of the 110th Infantry, which under Colonel Ripple was to consolidate with all forces at KOMMERSCHEIDT and attack to retake SCHMIDT.

About 0530 6 November "C" Company commander, a replacement officer, and the Reconnaissance Platoon Leader, with their jeeps loaded with ammunition followed the Reconnaissance platoon leader for another try at the KALL valley. They had not gone more than 300 yards south of VOSSENACK when the Reconnaissance Officer spotted an ambush of about 40 Germans. Both sides opened fire at the same time, a PANZERFAUST hit the Reconnaissance officers' jeep and a burst from a German machine gun hit his machine gunner and a man in the back seat. "C" Company Commander's machine gun jammed and he was forced to bail out as a German lunged at him with a bayonet. This he slapped aside and with those who had not been hit returned to VOSSENACK. Here they found the 2d Platoon of "E" Company which was going to attempt to cross the valley alone since they had not seen the supply column earlier in the night. 37

The Reconnaissance Platoon leader asked for two destroyers to help him get his two men who had been wounded. It was still dark and foggy and as they neared the ambush he gave the order to fire. The destroyers opened up with machine guns they had installed on the top of the turrets killing and wounding some of the Germans, the rest fled. They found the two men, one dead, the other seriously wounded.

About this time, Colonel Ripple and the infantry battalion arrived. The "C" Company commander requested a platoon of infantry to clear the MSR and accompany the Tank Destroyer platoon across the valley. This was not possible in view of the mission assigned the Task Force, its reduced strength (the battalion was down to 200 men plus 100 heavy weapons men) and because it was an engineer mission to keep the trail opened. "C" Company commander therefore crossed on foot with the infantry column which skirted the trail and fought its way through the valley. 38 The Reconnaissance Platoon Leader was left to guide the destroyers up, and as they started down the trail they met some engineers who told them damaged vehicles blocked the trail and that it was mined. They returned to the edge of the woods and waited for it to be cleared.

On 6 November operations continued with but little success. The initiative was passing to the enemy. The weather continued to be bad, roads were quagmires, there was no place for men to dry their wet clothing, enemy artillery, direct fire and small arms poured into KOMMERSCHEIDT, from three sides, VOSSENACK received its share of enemy fire. The situation in VOSSENACK was, by noon considerably weakened. The Germans had moved in as far as the church. 39 (See Map D) A visit to the tank company CP in GERMETER was made to coordinate a counterattack to be made by the engineers, supported by tanks and TDs. This counterattack took place early in the afternoon and was only partly successful. Another was planned for the following morning as more engineers were arriving to fight as infantry. A visit to the Infantry battalion CP in VOSSENACK which was now located in a cellar on the north side of town, some 200 yards west of the church brought forth a request for some fire on an unknown number of enemy 120 mm mortars in the draw about 500 yards north of the CP. The platoon leader of the first platoon in "B" Company had reported that heavy mortar fire was coming in on him from this same area.

Company "B" was assigned the mission, and the Reconnaissance Company Commander volunteered to observe and adjust the fire of the two guns from the 2d platoon which were readied to move out. Using a handy-talkie radio the Reconnaissance Officer moved to the open ground north of VOSSENACK, while the TDs moved to positions some 500 yards east of GERMETER. A concentration of high explosive and white phosphorus was directed at the Reconnaissance Officer as he adjusted time fire over their general location. He then called for super-quick fuses. The mortar fire ceased as the three-inch guns raked up and down the draw. No further mortar fire was received from that direction. 40

The third platoon of "B" Company waited all day at the head of the draw. The engineer work in the valley was slow, most of them having been pulled out to fight as infantry in VOSSENACK. Shortly after dark a German patrol attacked the destroyers. The patrol was finally driven off by the number of hand grenades thrown at them. The platoon requested and received permission to return to GERMETER.

In KOMMERSCHEIDT the 6th of November was a bad day. Only two types of positions were available, cover positions in the woods north of town or exposed positions on the flanks of town and in the rubble. These exposed positions were under enemy tank and self-porpelled gun fire, principally from the dominating SCHMIDT area and the east. It was necessary for the armor to occupy the exposed positions if the infantry was to hold KOMMERSCHEIDT. All thought of attacking SCHMIDT was forgotten. It took all forces available to hold against the frequent enemy attacks throughout the day.

During the day "C" Company was reduced to three operational destroyers, five damaged destroyers, and crew members of guns incapable of firing now fighting as infantry. The emergency rations and small arms ammunition stowed on the vehicles were being put to use. It was their only source of supply. However they were little concerned with eating, only with survival and relief. Four fully operational tanks were left at the end of the day. Three others had damaged turrets.

On the division front there was little progress during the 6th of November. To the north the 109th Infantry continued pressure, and in the afternoon the 12th RCT of the 4th Infantry Division began to relieve them. To the south the 110th Infantry cleared several pockets of resistance within their area. Artillery, mortar, and small arms fire continued to be heavy and casualties mounted. 41

During the night 6-7 November the principle concern of the battalion commander was to reinforce and re-supply Company "C". The 112th Infantry Supply officer had assigned the battalion two weasels for re-supply of the company. These were a part of a large convoy he had organized to cross the KALL valley that night. The S-4 of the 893d TD Battalion loaded these with ammunition and medical equipment as requested by "C" Company commander and the Administrative Officer of "C" Company was to accompany them. Also organized to accompany this column was a make-shift platoon of destroyers. This platoon consisted of four replacement destroyers for "C" Company, personnel from "C" Company headquarters (administrative, maintenance, and supply personnel) and the personnel from the destroyer which had developed a leaking recoil mechanism. The column got as far as GERMETER, most of the column halted when a long and heavy artillery concentration landed along the road. Some of the supply column continued on but "C" companies supplies were not delivered. The make-shift platoon never reached the MSR. The lead destroyer became bogged down on the trail south of "C" Company's rear CP, the second bogged down attempting to by-pass it and the untrained crews of the remaining two TDs could do little more than tow them back out of the soft area. 42

A conference was also held with the Assistant Division Commander relative to the organization of Task Force Davis, which was to include two platoons of "B" Company and the make-shift platoon of "C" Company. More definite instructions were to be issued later. However this plan was not carried out since the situation deteriorated even more before it could be put in effect. ⁽⁴²⁾

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