in support of the 28th Infantry Division
in the vicinity of Vossenack, Germany
2-9 November 1944 - (Rhineland Campaign)
By Major John J Lavin
THE BATTALION IS COMMITTED IN ITS ANTI-TANK ROLE
At 0910 hours on the 4th, 14 enemy tanks were reported southeast and east of VOSSENACK, their exact location not yet known. At 1000 hours the division Anti-tank officer passed on to battalion the mission to repel a tank attack coming from the direction of HURTGEN, using Plan "B" modified. Company "C" less one platoon was given the mission and ordered to the vicinity of RICHELSKAUL, preceded by elements of its attached Reconnaissance platoon. The remaining Platoon consisting of 3 guns was ordered to the new indirect fire position. A radio relay station was set up on high ground some 3000 yards west of RICHELSKAUL in order that contact be maintained with the battalion command post and "B" Company in the rear and the battalion commanders party and "C" Company in the vicinity of RICHELSKAUL.
Meanwhile elements of Reconnaissance Company continuing their mission of route reconnaissance reported that the main road entering RICHELSKAUL from the south was not entirely in our hands nor was it cleared of mines. They also reported that the trail entering GERMETER from the west was not yet cleared of mines and that the north south trail some 1000 yards west of GERMETER was mined 500 yards north of the trail junction. (See Map D)
In the GERMETER-VOSSENACK area enemy tanks had been neither seen nor heard. Towed guns of the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion which had supported the initial attack of the 112th Infantry were well disposed along the GERMETER road and additional towed guns ware reported enroute. Since there was no tank attack, "C" Company was ordered to move its new indirect fire positions and install grousers. (Grousers were attachments for full-tracked vehicles which gave them increased traction for negotiating soft and steep ground.)
An additional mission to reconnoiter for other routes to KOMMERSCHEIDT was received since it was apparent the trail being used by the tanks of the 707th Tank Battalion was almost impassible. The platoon leader of the Reconnaissance attached to "C" Company completed this task and reported that no other route was passable, that the route the tanks were using needed improvement because it was too narrow for our vehicles and that it was blocked by three tanks which had thrown tracks or were otherwise damaged. The Reconnaissance officer also reported that the earliest time the trail could be cleared was by dawn the following morning and then only by additional help for, or increased effort by the engineers. This information was passed on to Division by radio and to the Division Anti-tank officer who arrived at RICHELSKAUL about 1430 hours. 27
Reports of enemy tanks continued to come in, including a radio intercept report that enemy tanks were moving against SCHMIDT. Since the towed Tank Destroyers were not to arrive for some time, the Division ATO ordered that two platoons of the 893d TD Bn. take up positions in VOSSENACK. The guns moved up to RICHELSKAUL while the company commander and platoon leaders went into VOSSENACK to select positions in the rubble of the town. It was almost dark before they returned and took the guns into positions. The company commander reported he had been unable to determine infantry dispositions in town since only a few men were seen and these suffering from fatigue and shock due to heavy enemy artillery fire. Since the situation was obscure the battalion commander, his party and the Division ATO decided to contact the commander of the 2d Battalion 112th Infantry to effect necessary coordination. At the infantry CP it was learned that the heavy artillery and mortar fire, which let up to some extent at night, was causing exceptionally heavy casualties to the infantry dug in on the east sloped of VOSSENACK and that a tank attack was expected. Liaison and coordination were effected about 1915 hours. The 3d Platoon of "C" Company was in positions south of the town near the church, and the 1st Platoon was in position of readiness near GERMETER.
While the battalion commanders' party was in VOSSENACK orders were received at 1700 hours from Division Artillery to move the number of destroyers necessary to VOSSENACK to repel any tank attack. Since the battalion commander was on foot and could not be contacted, the executive officer ordered "B" Company to VOSSENACK immediately. So it was as the battalion commander was returning to the division CP that he met "B" Company on the trail southwest of RICHELSKAUL. Upon learning that division had ordered them up, the battalion commander ordered them to take up positions in GERMETER and await further instructions. Several destroyers had togged down in the old area but by dawn the company tank recovery vehicle had drawn them out and they had joined the company in GERMETER. 28
Upon arrival at the Division CP at 2130 hours instructions were received to send one company to KOMMERSCHEIDT as soon as the road was opened. A combined infantry-tank attack by elements of the 89 Infantry Division and 116th Panzer Division had retaken SCHMIDT early in the day. The 28th Division planned to attack SCHMIDT again the following day, and "C" Company would have the mission of establishing road blocks on the three routes into SCHMIDT. 29
The battalion commander and operations officer then returned to the battalion command post where remainder of the staff and the Reconnaissance Company commander were briefed. The latter officer was given a brief written order for "B" and "C" Company commanders and told to elaborate on this to insure understanding of the new mission assigned each company. These instructions called for "C" Company to cross to KOMMERSCHEIDT as soon as the trail was opened, "B" Company to move into VOSSENACK, inform the infantry battalion commander of the change and relieve "C" Company's liaison at that command post.
A review of the events taking place on 4 November indicated that the situation was not too promising. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was heavy and accurate, enemy tanks were reported on all three sides of the division salient, trouble with the MSR across the KALL River was increasing, units south of the river were under almost continuous pressure, in the south, a battalion of the 110th, the divisions only reserve, had reached SIMONSKALL in a flanking move, all units were suffering heavy casualties, and the enemy's pressure was increasing. Weather continued to be bad thereby eliminating needed air-support. Communication was almost entirely by radio, since wires were destroyed almost as soon as they were repaired. 30
During the night 4-5 November Companies "B" and "C" made their change-over in VOSSENACK during which time their movements brought on an artillery concentration which blanketed the town. One platoon of "B" Company was guided by the infantry to positions on the open slope east of VOSSENACK en-route they lost one destroyer which fell thru rubble into a cellar. A second platoon was disposed north of the center of town, and the last platoon took up positions on the left of the second platoon. Meanwhile "C" Company moved to an assembly area south of VOSSENACK where the trail enters the woods and waited for the attached Reconnaissance platoon to report the route open.
At this spot the Kall Trail enters the woods
Here the destroyers took on mortar and miscellaneous ammunition which an officer of the 112th asked them to take across the valley. The three gun platoon of "C" Company lost another destroyer which hit a mine on the trail southwest of RICHELSKAUL, as it was coming up to join the remainder of the company. By the time they had removed the casualties, ammunition and useful equipment had arrived in VOSSENACK, it was daylight and the other platoons of "C" Company were in the KALL valley en-route to KOMMERSCHEIDT.
