Hurtgen Forest and Roer Valley
10-17 Dev. 1944 - (Rhineland Campaign)
By Captain Raymond C. Greis
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
The foregoing description of this operation demonstrates that the 2d Battalion, 329th Infantry won a clear-cut victory over the Germans. However, the following points may be criticized:
| I. | The battalion was committed to the front lines the day before the attack. Had the battalion been allowed to attack through the 8th Infantry lines from assembly areas in the rear, most of the casualties that came as a result of the relief could have been avoided. |
| II. | Forward observers could have been sent out ahead of the line of departure with patrols. Thus, an artillery and mortar preparation might have been placed on the enemy initially, saving time and casualties. |
| III. | After the enemy lines in the forest had been penetrated, no effort was made to exploit this penetration until the next day. However, exploitation might have ended in disaster, since resupply was very difficult, due to the mined condition of the area over which the battalion was operating. |
| IV. | The enemy can be criticized for not counterattacking in strength immediately. The 2d Battalion had been allowed a whole day to organize a defense before the main counterattack came in Gurzenich. |
| V. | The fire power the enemy used in the counterattack in Gurzenich had little effect, since all the 2d Battalion's troops were well shielded by the houses in the town. Had this same amount of artillery been placed on the 2d Battalion while it was still in the forest, the enemy might have succeeded in stopping the initial attack. |
Much of the credit for this successful operation should go to the men who fought so hard for their leaders. The willingness of the men to close with the enemy in the forest clearly turned the tide of battle.
In summary of the above analysis, the successful conclusion of the operation was the inevitable result of the following factors:
| I. | Battle experienced troops and leaders. |
| II. | Careful planning continuously throughout the action. |
| III. | The use of fire power -- every officer and man had learned the value of fire power and applied this knowledge to good effect. |
| IV. | The absolute refusal of each and every nan to give ground before an enemy counterattack. |
| V. | Brilliant deployment of the battalion to permit continuous protection of flanks and rear during the attack. |
The battalion's losses during this action were 162 men killed or wounded. Most of these casualties were suffered by "F" and "G" Companies -- each company losing about 70 men.
The enemy lost about 300 killed and about 580 prisoners.
