By Captain John H. Barner

NARRATION

The leading elements of the 2d Battalion crossed the line of departure at 0530 hours. 32 It was still dark and a steady snowfall driven by a light northeast wind helped add to the confusion during this time. The hedgerows through which the men moved had acted as "snow fences" and unusually large drifts were encountered. By 0600 hours first light appeared and some observation was gained although it was limited to 150 yards. F and G Companies hit the initial enemy defenses consisting of anti-personnel mine fields and wire barriers. 33 This had been expected and immediate breaching operations began with the use of explosives. 34 Concentrations of 50 mm and 120 mm mortar fire and 105 mm artillery began to fall on the troops performing these breaching operations. It was apparent that surprise had not been achieved and that the enemy was alerted for the attack. 35 Panzerfausts were fired into the trees, thus obtaining tree bursts which inflicted further casualties. Enemy automatic weapons including machine guns and machine pistols raked the area.

In order to add impetus to the attack the attached tanks of F Company were called on to assist in the neutralization of enemy automatic weapons. As the tanks moved forward into position their communication with F Company failed. The tanks were "buttoned up" and did not engage any targets or attempt to contact the foot elements.

Finally F Company's 3d Platoon Leader mounted the lead tank which was located just south of building 16 and from this position directed the movement of the tanks and his platoon. As a squad of F Company worked on building 22 and 23 the balance of the 3d Platoon and the tanks moved forward on the right. 36 As the lead tank approached building 24 it ran over a mine, throwing the F Company Platoon Leader to the ground. The resulting explosion also wounded the 3d Platoon Sergeant, two members of a BAR team and a rifleman. Another tank received a hit in the turret by a Panzerfaust and withdrew from action.

This Platoon Leader again mounted a tank as they approached more enemy wire just north of building 24. When the wire was reached he dismounted and assisted one of his men in placing the bangalore torpedo carried by the tank. This action breached the anti-tank mines which normally accompanied enemy wire in the area. After guiding the tank through the lane thus cleared the Platoon Leader remounted and continued to direct both the tanks and his platoon forward. 37 By this time buildings 22 and 23 had been cleared and the 3d Platoon of F Company started to swing north in accordance with the battalion plan of maneuver. 38 As the tank on which the Platoon Leader was riding crossed the main street of town it was hit by direct fire from an enemy self-propelled gun. The Platoon Leader was wounded and the tank knocked out. Enemy pressure on the right flank of F Company prevented it from crossing the street. The platoon stopped and reorganized on the south side of the street in buildings 23 to 94. That portion of F Company north of the street had made little progress during this time. It was expected that E Company would pass through momentarily although they had not arrived by 1930 hours.

Meanwhile G Company, with their 3d Platoon leading and echeloned to the right rear of the 3d Platoon of F Company, had breached the enemy wire and mine fields in their sector and had driven into the enemy defenses In buildings 25, 27, 28, and 29. 39 Although some casualties had occurred G Company was still a fighting unit as it wheeled south toward buildings 26 and 30.

At about 1030 hours the 1st Platoon of G Company passed through the 3d Platoon with the mission of securing building 98 to the east. After moving about 100 yards forward of buildings 27 and 28 they also stopped and waited for the arrival of E Company. 40

While the previously described actions were transpiring, the 2d Platoon of G Company had moved out to overlook the deep draw on the south flank of the 2d Battalion's zone of action. An enemy strong point was encountered which consisted of a machine gun emplaced behind an anti-personnel mine field and concertina wire. 41 After mortar fire had failed to completely eliminate this strongpolnt, the Platoon Leader ordered an assault with marching fire which successfully overran the position. Fifteen men remained in this platoon. 42 The strongpolnt had been reduced by 0800 hours and the platoon continued to the east toward objective 543. At about 0900 hours the platoon received small arms and machine gun fire from the south end of this objective. The platoon withdrew about 50 yards to the southwest where a wooded draw afforded cover and concealment for reorganization. Medical aid men attempting to evacuate casualties left in the open as a result of this withdrawal were met with heavy mortar concentrations. 43

All forward movement of the 2d Battalion had stopped in order to await the arrival of E Company. Considerable difficulty was experienced by the Battalion Commander as he attempted to commit E Company through F and G Companies. The time lag and inaccuracy in the flow of information from front line companies to the Battalion Observation Post contributed to the late start forward by E Company. At 0845 hours the Battalion Commander tried to contact E Company but it was not until 0908 hours that a report was made to the Regimental S-3 that E Company was moving according to plan. 44 By 1000 hours E Company had made slow progress in its move forward due to continued mortar and artillery fire throughout the entire area. One of the attached tanks was lost when it became stuck in the snow which filled a sunken road. As E Company approached the line of contact both F and G Companies renewed their attack.

The 1st Platoon of F Company wheeled to the north toward objective 26. Heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire was received from buildings 35, 36, and 40. Eleven casualties sustained during this small maneuver included a squad leader, two assistant squad leaders, a rocket launcher gunner, a runner, and the assistant gunner and ammunition bearer of the light machine gun section. 45 The 1st Platoon of H Company's heavy machine guns located in this area also received heavy losses as it fired in support of F Company. The Platoon Sergeant reported that each gun of the platoon had fired approximately one belt of ammunition when a mortar concentration scored a direct hit on his platoon. Two machine guns were destroyed. Twelve casualties (four killed), included two section leaders, three squad leaders, and 3 gunners occurred. As this platoon displaced forward the platoon sergeant encountered another serious difficulty. In attempting to use his "Beehive" shaped charge he learned that all the detonators had been given to one man in the platoon; this man was now a casualty and the detonators had been evacuated with him. 46

The 1st and 2d Platoons of ¡F Company continued to push forward and cleared buildings 12, 8, 10, 17, 18, 19, and 20. This forward movement relieved the pressure on the 3d Platoon which crossed to the north side of the main street. F Company was now regrouped for better tactical control.

After a slow start E Company gained momentum as their attack carried the 2d Platoon to buildings 42 and 39 which constituted Objective 28. The self-propelled gun which had previously knocked out an F Company attached tank was overrun during this advance. Additional forward movement of the 2d Platoon was blocked by intense small arms fire. In an attempt to continue his advance the E Company Commander committed his 3d Platoon on the right. This platoon had been decimated previous to this commitment when it was caught in an enemy mortar concentration near building 32. Casualties included the platoon sergeant and a squad leader. As this platoon moved forward it was hit by another mortar concentration in the vicinity of building 33. As it came abreast of the 2d Platoon it was stopped by fire from buildings 90 and 108. Still probing for an opening the 1st Platoon of E Company was committed on a wider maneuver around the right flank. This platoon was stopped at building 107 by fire coming from buildings 93 and 95 as well as from organized enemy defensive positions across the open field to the east. 47

E Company's attached tank platoon continued to dwindle as it moved forward. The lead tank lost a track as it ran over a mine located about 50 yards to the east of building 32. The platoon leader plus two of his crew members were killed as they abandoned the tank. Another tank received four direct hits from a self-propelled gun firing from a ridge on the southeast edge of town. Thus after less than four hours of action two tanks, with no platoon leader, remained operational to support E Company. Very little support had been secured from the tanks during the attack thus far. They were now held up by fire from an assault gun firing from buildings 84 and 67. The E Company Commander reported that his company was pinned down and unable to advance. 48 The Company Observation Post was reported to be in building 107.

The 2d Platoon of H Company'a heavy machine guns in direct support of G Company had also suffered heavy casualties during its displacement. The same mortar concentration which had caught the 3d Platoon of E Company also blanketed this platoon destroying one machine gun and killing or wounding the entire squad. This concentration also caused the loss of the G Company 1st Platoon Leader and the concussion started a creeping paralysis through the G Company Commanders back and shoulders. 49 This concentration consisted of 50 mm and 120 mm mortar fire as well as self-propelled gun fire. It was contained in an area about 200 yards in diameter. During this fire, as well as throughout much of the action, the troops would bunch behind available cover which offered safety from small arms fire. Such protection offered no immunity from high angle fire. This tendency materially increased the number of casualties suffered by the 2d Battalion.

The questioning of prisoners taken during the morning revealed that the boundary between the 980th and 981st Regiments was located 400 yards south of KESTERNICH's main street. In addition several prisoners reported that the 9th Battery, 272d Field Artillery, consisting of six 150 mm howitzers, had located its observation in the town. The battery location could not be determined. 50

By approximately 1200 hours It was apparent to the Battalion Commander that all attacking elements of the battalion had been stopped. The weather had turned bitter cold. Automatic weapons failed to function. Water in the canteens had frozen solid preventing wounded personnel from taking their wound tablets. Wire crews, who worked barehanded as they felt through the snow for wire lines, were seriously handicapped by this weather.

The Regimental Commander suggested that the remaining tanks be committed at this time to overcome the enemy automatic weapons fire. This did not appear to be the solution to the problem in light of the poor support received from the tanks thus far. 51 The Battalion Commander, accompanied by his Artillery Liaison Officer, H Company Commander, and SCR 300 operator, started forward from building 3 on a reconnaissance and inspection to determine the exact situation. As the Battalion Commander moved forward he noticed that the sketch did not include certain buildings. Also many of the roads ran through deep cuts and were filled with snow. This condition did not appear on the sketch and would have been of assistance to the attacking companies. However the sketch was accurate as to the information it did contain and was used constantly by all personnel. Upon arriving in the vicinity of building 98, which was on fire, the Battalion Commander and party contacted elements of G Company. They reported that fire from buildings 97, 96, and 95 was Impeding their advance. The Battalion Commander proceeded to the north along a hedgerow where the south (right) flank of E Company was located at building 107. These men were digging in under cover of the smoke from building 98. Proceeding further to the north along the line held by B Company it was observed that men were digging in with little regard for the mortar fire which fell at regular intervals. Upon reaching the 1st Platoon position of E Company the Battalion Commander asked the platoon sergeant If he was pinned down. He replied, "Hell, no! But the tanks cannot go forward so we were ordered to hold up here."

The E Company Commander was found at the Company Observation Post located in building 33. This location had been erroneously reported to the Battalion Command Post as building 107. After orienting the Battalion Commander on his situation the E Company Commander recommended that the company defend in its present position for the reasons that the fields of fire were good and the Initial objective {Objective 28) had been taken. He was informed that the battalion objective laid to the east of town and that was where the battalion would go. 52 Commanders of all units were called to building 33 to receive an order for the continuation of the attack. No representative of G Company arrived because the Company Commander was still partially paralyzed and the Executive Officer was busy conducting the company defense.

The attack order was brief. Actually it was intended to continue the original attack plans In a coordinated manner. No changes were made in supporting weapons. Smoke was to be placed on the ridge southeast of town. 53 All companies were to continue the attack at 1400 hours after a five minute artillery preparation. 54 E Company Commander requested that the attack be delayed until 1430 hours. This request was granted and all units informed. The Battalion Commander prooeeded to building 25 where he issued the order to the G Company Commander. Upon returning to building 33 he was again requested by the E Company Commander to delay the attack until 1500 hours. This request was also granted and all units were notified.

During the remaining time prior to 1500 hours the Battalion Commander questioned the Tank Company Commander concerning his tank operations up until the present time. His excuse for the lack of support he had given was that the foot elements would not move forward ahead of the tanks. At this time all infantry elements were well ahead of the foremost tank. Upon learning that this was the first action for this company and that they had never received any infantry-tank training, the Battalion Commander explained the meaning of various arm and hand signals used in communicating with tanks. It was further explained that tank commanders should be alert for signals such as "all clear" or a "fire order" for the next house which the infantry expected to assault. Finally the Tank Company was assigned fire support missions to assist in the resumption of the attack at 1500 hours. 55 Tank losses for the two committed platoons now totaled five tanks knocked out by fire or mines and one tank stuck in the snow.

At 1455 hours the artillery preparation began to fall and all companies resumed the attack at 1500 hours. 56 By 1630 hours F Company cleared buildings 34, 37, and 38. The advance continued toward buildings 35, 36, and 40. Casualties among key personnel continued. The mortar section leader and two more squad leaders were lost during this action.

E Company made little progress. The 1st Platoon Leader was wounded but reported his situation to the Battalion Observation Post prior to his evacuation. In spite of E Company's efforts to advance they were finally limited to their 1500 hour line of departure.

G Company met with more success on the south (right) flank of the battalion. By 1700 hours building 98 had been secured. All companies were ordered to hold in place at 1700 hours. By 1730 hours darkness had fallen. The Battalion Observation Post remained in building 33. Immediate steps were taken to reorganize the battalion, provide additional care for the wounded, and to prepare for a continuation of the attack in the morning.

A forward aid station was set up in building 19. Casualties which had not been evacuated were hauled to the aid station on sleds improvised from skis and stretchers. As men had fallen they sank below the level of the snow making it difficult to locate their position. However company aid men had spotted most of the casualties which were impossible to recover during daylight hours and led litter teams to these locations under the cover of darkness.

A wire head had been maintained at the Battalion Observation Post throughout the entire day. Additional wire was now laid to each company. All Installation was completed by 2330 hours. At 1700 hours the engineers declared that the main street had been cleared of mines up to building 19. An M-29 Carrier, commonly called a "weasel", had been assigned to the battalion for evacuation and supply. It was a full track vehicle about the size of a ¼ ton truck.

During the night this vehicle became extremely valuable for these purposes. At about 1830 hours a tank retriever came forward to repair and/or evacuate damaged tanks but it was disabled by an anti-tank mine in the road near building 5. This mine was probably one of our own in as much as this location was near the original line of departure which had not been in enemy hands since December, 1944. As a result none of the damaged tanks were repaired during the night. The one tank which had been stuck in the sunken road was recovered. 57

Plans and actions for the resumption of the attack on the morning of 31 January continued. Patrols were sent forward to breach the antitank mine fields. These fields were difficult to find under the deep snow. Assault platoons were reinforced by adding personnel from the various company headquarters. Both of H Company's heavy machine gun platoons were reinforced by reducing the size of the 81mm Mortar Platoon. Automatic weapons such as machine guns and BARS were thawed out by putting them in a basement where some means of heating was available.

At 1800 hours the E Company Commander reported to the Battalion Commander at building 33 where he asked to be relieved of his command. He stated that he could not continue ordering men whom he had known for a long period of time to certain death or injury. He further stated that he was afraid this weakness would endanger the accomplishment of the battalion mission. He was relieved at once and the Executive Officer of E Company assumed command. The Battalion Commander commented that this officer's personal courage was beyond question. He had repeatedly exposed himself during the days action as he fought his company. In order to give the new E Company Commander time for a daylight reconnaissance on 31 January the Battalion Commander set the jump-off time at 0830 hours and then reported to the Regimental Command Post. 58

The Regimental Commander was greatly disturbed by the fact that the 2d Battalion was the only unit in the division which had not secured its objectives on schedule. He ordered an aggressive all-out attack for 31 January. Plans had already been made by the 2d Battalion for such an attack. While intelligence reports at division had been accurate as to strengths no indications were made that may have revealed the enemy's intention to make a determined stand in KESTERNICH. 59 It was now apparent that the enemy intended to defend this vital objective as long as it was possible to do so.

E Company shifted the 1st and 3d Platoons to the north, away from the open fields in which they had been located. The 1st Platoon was to attack eastward on the south side of the main street as the 3d Platoon attacked in the same direction on the north side of the street. The 2d Platoon was to attack to the northeast, in conjunction with F Company, to seize Objective 27. 60

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