(4TH INFANTRY DIVISION) IN THE HURTGEN FOREST,
GERMANY, 16-22 NOVEMBER 1944
(RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
By Lieutenant Colonel James W. Haley
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
In analyzing and criticizing the operations of the 2nd Battalion, it is necessary to keep in mind the terrain over which the battalion operated and the bad weather conditions that existed during the period. Further, it must be remembered that information on which the initial attack was based was extremely limited through no fault nor neglect of the 2nd Battalion.
It is difficult to piece the responsibility or to determine who was at fault for the lack of information available to the 2nd Battalion on which to plan the attack of 16 November. The no-patrolling order was apparently well conceived but it is evident that the enemy was well aware of the coming attack. I believe that had the Battalion been given the opportunity to probe the enemy position with patrols that a weakness in his defenses could have been located and the attack launched in an area where it would have been successful. This belief is substantiated by the successful attack of the 3rd Battalion on 18 November which was launched only a short distance to the right of the area in which the 2nd Battalion attacked on 16 November. It is further believed that regardless of the lack of information, the Battalion plan should have anticipated that the enemy position would be mined and wired and that provisions for breaking those obstacles should have been included in the plan.
The difficulties of the terrain over which the Battalion was to attack were fully realized by the Battalion Commander. His administrative plans were complete and were designed to overcome these difficulties. The efficiency of the Battalion Surgeon and his Medical Section and sense of responsibility and attention to duty were of the highest order. The determination and courage displayed by the litter teams in spite of the tremendous difficulties encountered in the evacuation of the numerous casualties doubtlessly saved an untold number of lives. Nothing but praise can be given to the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon for its work throughout the night in hand carrying supplies forward and bringing the wounded to the rear.
In my opinion, the Regimental Commander erred in ordering the 2nd Battalion to continue the attack on 17 November. To me it is evident that due to the severe losses suffered, on 16 November, the Battalion was in no condition to continue offensive operations against a prepared position, manned by a capable and determined enemy. It probably would have been more advantageous, to commit the 3rd Battalion on the 17th since this Battalion had not yet been engaged. The 2nd Battalion had lost so severely in key personnel and the spirit and determination of the troops had been so lowered by the severe mauling of the previous day that only a token attack could be mounted on the 17th.
Considering that the Battalion was ordered to attack on 17 November, the Battalion Commander could probably have devised a better and more thorough plan of attack. The attack of the Battalion over the same ground and with the same scheme of maneuver used on 16 November was doomed to failure before it started. Had the plan called for a shift to the right, the attack to be made in a column of companies with G Company leading and launched with the possibility of gaining surprise, it is possible that the enemy line could have been broken.
The one day allotted to the 2nd Battalion for reorganization after the disastrous attacks of 16-17 November was insufficient. The attack which the 2nd Battalion made on 19 November could well have been made by the 1st Battalion which had not been committed prior to this time. The 2nd Battalion at less than two-thirds strength, including the replacements received on 18 November, and with an average of two officers per company, excluding Battalion Headquarters Company, could well have used another day for reorganizing.
Although I agree that the relieving of the 2nd Battalion Commander on 18 November was probably desirable, I feel that he should not be too severely criticized for the failure of the attacks on 16-17 November. It is likely that his will to fight had been destroyed but in my opinion, his request that the 2nd Battalion be withdrawn on the night of 16 November and his statement to the Regimental Commander on the afternoon of 17 November to the effect that the Battalion was not in condition to continue the attack on 18 November, were sound and justified.
The attack of the 2nd Battalion on 19 November which was successful in gaining some 900 yards was made with great difficulty. The morale of the troops was decidedly low and they possessed very little fighting spirit. Great credit must be given to the new Battalion Commander for the success of this attack. It was primarily due to his courage, determination and personal example that the Battalion even succeeded in getting beyond the line of departure. His plan of attack was simple but yet complete and this is the only kind of plan that the Battalion was capable of executing at this time. His presence at the head of the Battalion throughout the day carried the Battalion forward.
The demonstration made by the 2nd Battalion on 20 November played a major role in the successful attack delivered by the 1st Battalion on the left flank of the regimental zone. The plan for this feint was well conceived, well drawn and well executed. Undoubtedly the enemy's attention was focused on the 2nd Battalion on the right flank of the regimental zone. This fact is substantiated by the large volume of fire placed on the 2nd Battalion's position and by the light resistance initially encountered by the 1st Battalion in its attack. As a result of this feint and the successful attack of the 1st Battalion, the enemy's first line of resistance had now been broken in three different areas.
The attack of the 2nd Battalion on 21 November succeeded in obtaining a measure of surprise. Instead of a frontal attack against the enemy position, which had stopped the advance of the Battalion late in the afternoon of 19 November, the Battalion Commander decided to make an envelopment to the left. The companies were well disposed for this movement and as a result of the low visibility, due to the dense woods and foggy weather, the Battalion was able to outflank the enemy strong point without being detected. A gain of 1000 yards was registered against relatively light resistance until the enemy's next prepared position was encountered. This flanking movement forced the enemy to withdraw from the strong point which had stopped the Battalion on 19 November.
Much credit is due the Battalion for stopping the counterattack on the afternoon of 21 November. Contact was so close that the use of artillery and mortar fire was impossible with the result that the fighting became hand to hand. The counterattack was so determined that the Battalion line was penetrated and because of the heavy woods, the fighting became a series of individual and small group engagements. Contact between units was lost and control became exceedingly difficult but by nightfall the line had been restored and the Germans who had made the penetration had all been killed or captured. Only determined troops could have repulsed such a counterattack. The Battalion's attack on 22 November was a continuation of that of the previous day. The fact that any advance at all was made is a tribute to the courage and determination of the men and the initiative and leadership of the officers. Very heavy casualties had been suffered in the stubborn fighting of the previous day and the tactical unity of the companies was completely disorganized. The Battalion now had not had a hot meal for four days, had spent four wet and miserably cold night without rolls and had been subjected to tremendously heavy fire for seven days and nights, with the exception of 18 November. In spite of these problems, the Battalion gained 1500 yards in the attack this day.
In my opinion, troops who are fight in heavily wooded areas must receive prior training in this type of fighting. A captured document of the 183rd Volks Grenadier Division, which was encountered in the Hurtgen Forest, read in part as follows: "In combat in wooded areas the American showed himself completely unfit". 65
I believe that special formations must be adopted for fighting in woods and special means employed for maintaining control and direction. The 2nd Battalion could well have made use of the week spent in the forest prior to the attack of 16 November in training for combat in dense woods.
It is very important that replacements receive a period of indoctrination by the receiving unit before being committed to action. All too often in the Hurtgen Forest replacements were killed or wounded without ever reaching the front line. Hardly ever did they have the chance to learn the name of their company commander.
In summarizing the results of the operations of the 2nd Battalion during the period 16-22 November, it is necessary to again recall the difficulties encountered with the weather and the heavily wooded, rough terrain. The lack of roads in the area also played a major role in the problems of the Battalion. In spite of these difficulties, and the severe reverses in the attacks on 16-17 November, the Battalion continued to press the attack and add greatly to the ultimate accomplishment of the regimental objective. Operating almost constantly at less than fifty percent strength and suffering from the loss of all rifle company commanders, the Battalion continued to advance, repelling daily counterattacks and inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. Three prepared enemy positions were encountered and each was broken. Numerous prisoners were captured. Much of the credit must go to the skill, initiative and leadership of the officers but in the final analysis, it was the courage and determination of the man with the rifle who met and overcame the miserably cold and wet weather, the fanatical German defenders and the mine fields and prepared defenses of the Hurtgen Forest. To give the reader some idea of the stubborn resistance encountered, the 4th Infantry Dvision suffred 5,260 battle casualties between 6 November and 8 December. 66 And several other divisions suffered as heavily. Of the above casualties, roughly one-third were suffered by the 8th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion was the heaviest loser in the 8th Infantry with a large proportion of its losses being systained between 16-22 November. During the battle, five enemy regiments were met and defeated by the 8th Infantry.
The Battle of the Hurtgen Forest, as bloody and bitter a fight as any of the war, brought no glorious victory. No major breakthrough was made nor large area overrun by our troops. But the enemy paid a costly price in heavy casualties for his stubborn defense and undoubtedly the paying of this price hastened the end of the war in Europe.
