By Lieutenant Colonel James W. Haley

THE BATTALION PLAN - 20 NOVEMBER

As a result of oral orders delivered to the Battalion Commander early on the night of 19 November, the 2nd Battalion was to make a demonstration on the morning of 20 November. This feint was to be in support of the attack of the 1st Battalion which was comitted on the left flank of the zone to clear the road running east from Schevenhütte. The demonstration was to begin at 0830 in order to cover the movement of the 1st Battalion which was to cross the line of departure at 0900. The plan called for the 81 mm Mortar Platoon to fire a fifteen minute concentration followed by a concentration of smoke. As the smoke concentration began the heavy machine gun platoons of H company, which were in position on the line with F and G Companies, were to fire rapid fire for the next ten minutes. No movement of troops was to take place and all men were cautioned ta take cover from the enemy artillery and mortar fire which was expected as a result of the feint. 51

THE BATTALION DEMONSTRATION - 20 NOVEMBER

The 81 mm Mortar platoon opened fire at 0830. For the first five minutes the rate of fire was the maximum that the crews could attain. The woods in front of the Battalion position echoed with the burst of the shells. And as was expected the German reaction was immediate. Machine guns from the log bunkers facing the Battalion opened fire and artillery and mortar shells began falling in the area. Fortunately, our troops had learned to provide their holes with overhead cover and casualties from the enemy fire were to be very light. By the time H Company's machine guns had opened fire, the enemy's fire was extremely heavy. There could be no doubt but what he expected the 2nd Battalion to attack. 52

The effectiveness of the feint was immediately obvious. The 1st Battalion crossed the line of departure and advanced 1000 yards against only slight resistance with hardly any artillery or mortar fire being encountered. It is undoubtedly true that the enemy's attention had been focused on the 2nd Battalion and that the attack of the 1st Battalion took him by surprise. For the remainder of the day and night the front along the 2nd Battalion sector was quiet, marked only by an occasional burst of machine gun fire or a few rounds of artillery. The cold, rainy weather continued and light snow fell during the day. After the demonstration, the Battalion occupied itself with trying to keep warm, reorganizing to the extent possible while in contact, and making plans for resumption of the attack on the following day.

THE BATTALION PLAN - 21 NOVEMBER

By 20 November all three battalions of the Regiment had been committed and the enemy first line of resistance had been penetrated in three places. Since the battalions had attacked on very narrow fronts and at widely separated points, there was no physical contact between battalions. Although the first enemy line had been broken, there were many enemy strong points behind the front line of the Regiment. Visibility was so reduced by the dense forest and the weather conditions that the attacking troops would often by-pass these enemy positions without being observed.

In order to close the gap between the 3rd Battalion and the 2nd Battalion, the 2nd Battalion was to attack to the northeast on 21 November. The plan of attack was to again advance in a column of companies in the order of E, F and G Companies. The attack was to move along the fire break which ran to the northeast (See Map D). One platoon of heavy machine guns from H Company was again attached to E and F Companies to follow the advance of those companies. The 81 mm Platoon was to be prepared to support the attack on call from its position in vicinity of Bend. The platoon was alerted to be prepared to displace forward during the day to a position selected by the Commanding Officer of H Company. The attached platoon of tanks was again to remain in reserve since no roads by which they could move to support the attack were available. In an effort to gain surprise, the artillery was not to fire a preparation but was to be prepared to support the attack on call. The Battalion Command Group was to follow the advance of E Company. The attack was to jump off from present positions at 0900.

The administrative plan was to be the same as for preceding attacks accept that the ammunition supply point had been pushed forward during the night of 20 November. The road running east from Schevenhütte had now been opened almost to the triangle on the top of the ridge (See Map D) and this road was to be used as the route of advance of supplies and ammunition.

From the furthest point of vehicle movement it would again be necessary to hand carry the ammunition and supplies and to evacuate the wounded by litter teams. 53

THE BATTALION ATTACK - 21 NOVEMBER

At 0900, the advance began with only light artillery fire being encountered. The enemy positions at the lead of the draw were found to have been recently evacuated with much equipment, including two heavy mortars, having been abandoned by the enemy. The advance continued against only slight resistance until the triangle was reached at which point E Company came under very heavy michine gun and rifle fire from prepared enemy positions in and around the triangle. E Company was unable to advance and F Company was comitted to the left. Just as F Company had deployed and moved upon line with E Company, an enemy counterattack in company strength struck the front lines from the direction of the Renn Weg road. This counterattack was so determined that the Germans succeeded in overrunning the Battalion line between E and F Companies and penetrated all the way back to the reserve company. It had been impossible to bring artillery fire down on the counterattack because the low visibility prevented the attack from being observed until it had actually hit the line of E and F Companies. Only after close hand to hand fighting by individuals and small groups was the attack finally stopped. Even the Command Group became engaged. 54

As soon as the enemy attack had been stopped, G Company was committed and soon the line had been restored. All the Germans who had penetrated the Battalion's line were killed or captured.

Approximately thirty-five to forty prisoners were captured, and later two truck loads of dead Germans were picked up in the area. As an example of how close the fighting became, a rifleman of E Company killed all four members of a German machine gun crew with his rifle at a range of 15 yards. These Germans were in the act of crawling forward to the edge of a thicket to place to place their gun in action. 55

After the counterattack had been repulsed, G Company was echeloned to the right rear of the Battalion and sent a platoon to each of Hills 401 and 402. These platoons found that the enemy positions on these two hills had bean recently evacuated and it was suspected that the counterattacking force had moved against the Battalion from these positions. 56

The attack was continued with E and F Companies abreast, E Company on the right, with G Company echeloned to the right rear protecting the right flank. Heavy resistance continued throughout the day with direct fire from self-propelled guns firing down the Renn Weg causing numerous casualties. By 1700, the Battalion's advance had reached a point on the Renn Weg about 500 yards southeast of the triangle and here the Battalion tied in for the night. A perimeter defense was taken up with G Company protecting the flanks and rear. 57

Again the carrying parties and litter bearers worked until well after midnight. The road running east from Schevenhütte had been cleared to a point about 2000 yards east of the village but was under heavy fire from the enemy artillery almost continuously. Under cover of darkness, vehicles brought supplies for the Battalion as far forward as possible and the carrying parties moved them the remaining distance by hand. The Battalion Medical Section established a collecting point at the furthest point of vehicle advance and shuttled the casualties back to the aid station by jeep as they were brought in by the litter bearers. Again the Battalion was destined to spend a cold, wet, miserable night since it was impossible to bring the men's rolls forward. 58

THE BATTALION PLAN OF ATTACK - 22 NOVEMBER

The Battalion plan for 22 November was for a continuation of the attack of the previous day. E and F Companies were to continue the attack abreast, with E Company on the right, and G Company was to be in reserve, protecting the right flank. The 81 mm Mortar Platoon was to be prepared to support the attack from its new position east of Schevenhütte.

The administrative plan and other details of the attack were to be the same as on preceding days. The attack was to jump off from the front line positions at 0630 hours without an artillery preparation, again seeking to gain surprise. 59

The Battalion Executive Officer began making plans on the night of 21 November for the movement of the Command Post to a forward location early on the morning of 22 November. The Company Commander of Headquarters Company was directed to select a new Command Post along the road east of Schevenhütte early the next morning and to begin immediately to install communications and organize the movement of the headquarters. 60

THE BATTALION ATTACK - 22 NOVEMBER

At 0630, just as the cold, bleak day was dawning, the Battalion crawled from its muddy holes and moved forward. The early hour of the attack and the absence of an artillery preparation took the Germans by surprise and initially the advance of the Battalion was rapid. Numerous prisoners were taken and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. One concrete pill box and four or five log bunkers, together with an extensive trench system astride the Renn Weg, were overrun by the Battalion by 0800. (See Map D) The attack was continued but by now the Germans had recovered from the surprise and resistance became very stubborn. The enemy artillery and self-propelled gun fire became extrememly heavy and the advance of the Battalion was slowed. G Company was comitted on the right of E Company early in the morning and the advance moved slowly forward. After hard, close fighting throughout the day, by 1700, the Battalion had reached a point astride the Renn Weg about 200 yards short of the right-south boundary of the Regiment. At this time, G Company was pulled back to battalion reserve and the Battalion took up a perimeter defense for the night. 61

The activities during the night were the sam as on previous nights. The main supply route had been openened to the triangle during the day but still supplies had to be hand carried from that point to the Battalion position, a distance of some 1500 yards. 62

By 1200 hours on 22 November, the Battalion Command Post had completed its movement to the new location. The new Command Post was un underground log shelter, a former German Command Post, from which three dead Germans were removed. It was located just off the road about 1100 yards east of Schevenhütte. 63

When the Battalion Commander arrived back at the new Command Post after dark on the evenening of 22 November, he was informed by the Battalion Executive Officer that the Battalion was to be relieved the following moring and pulled back to an assembly area in the vicinity of Schevenhütte to receive a much needed rest and reorganize. He was further informed that he was to immediatly report to the Regimental Command Post from whence he would depart for a brief visit with his brother who was in a nearby field hospital as a result of having lost a foot to a German mine. The Executive Officer was to take command of the Battalion in the absence of the Battalion Commander and to effect the relief of the Battalion on the following morning. 64

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