By Sidney A Salomon (1913 - 2004)
2 Silver Stars; Purple Heart w/Oak Leaf Cluster

INTRODUCTION

When veterans of the Second Ranger Battalion (Rangers) get together, the topic of their conversation inevitably turns to the Normandy Invasion of June 6,1944, (Omaha Beach, the cliffs of Normandy) and the Hurtgen Forest Hill 400 campaign of November/December 1944. The courage and sacrifice of the Rangers during the Normandy Invasion has been highlighted by the 1984 visit of President and Mrs. Reagan to Pointe du Hoc and the Ranger place of honor in the 40th anniversary ceremonies for D-Day. The Hurtgen Forest - Hill 400 campaign, however, has never been completely documented or highlighted. The valor of the Rangers, particularly in the winter of 1944, remains largely unreported. The above two campaigns stand out in the memories of Rangers because the odds against success of their mission were so tremendous and their casualties so high. They were referred to by some as suicidal missions. There were many other battles, however, where the odds were more reasonable.

The Rangers were a small, highly trained independent infantry battalion, under corps control, with 485 enlisted men and 27 officers, numerically less than half of the number of a divisional infantry battalion. Corps, in turn, would in critical situations, attach the Rangers to a division. The publicity about the specific combat mission would generally feature the glowing feats of the division, rather than the attached troops. During the Hurtgen Forest - Hill 400 campaign, the Rangers were attached to four different divisions. Little wonder that their courage and sacrifice received so little attention. One division commander was an exception. In appreciation for Ranger efforts while attached to his division during this campaign, he recommended a second Presidential unit citation for the Rangers. He also insisted that each Ranger who survived Hill 400 be given a leave to one of three rest and recreation centers. Unfortunately, some of these men on leave were called back to the battalion when the Germans launched the Ardennes offensive before their leaves expired. Notwithstanding their tremendous casualties, ready or not, the 2nd Ranger Battalion was committed to action in the "Battle of the Bulge" as the Ardennes offensive became known.

This report thus covers the period of 14 November 1944 through 11 December 1944, and includes the combat operations in the Hurtgen Forest in and around Germeter, Vossenack, Bergstein and culminating with the assault on Hill 400. Four divisions, three infantry and one armored, were in the area during this time period, and the rangers were attached to them, successfully holding ground against numerically larger enemy units.

The successful Hill 400 assault began early on the morning of 7 December 1944. The Rangers quickly took the Hill and captured or killed many German soldiers. But then the counterattacks began and continued for forty-eight hours. The casualty rate of the Rangers was very high. The Germans were unrelenting in their counterattacks, as the ground which they were defending was to be a major pathway for the projected German winter offensive, an offensive planned and directed by Hitler personally. However, the Rangers held the high ground in Vossenack and Germeter, captured and then held the vital observation post on Hill 400. As a result, Hitler was blocked from reaching the main highway to the port of Antwerp, Belgium and his left flank was exposed to a successful counterattack by the armored forces of General Patton.

It was in November of 1944 that General Patton's Third Army drive across France had sputtered to a grinding halt. The supply lines were long, the supply of gasoline for the armored columns was short and there was too little ammunition. The Allied front was bogged down for hundreds of miles, the forward infantry divisions of First Army huddled in the winter cold along the eastern route through Luxembourg, France and Belgium. What was needed was one grand offensive before the hazards of winter weather made advancement more difficult than it already was. General Hodges, Commander of the First Army, had the responsibility of putting the offensive into action, and General Gerow, his V Corps Commander, was to serve as the point Corps. V Corps had led the successful Normandy Invasion and had been on the offensive ever since. The infantry divisions comprising V Corps had recently pushed across the Belgian and French borders and were holding ground in Germany, but not without problems.

The Allied military command was looking ahead to the crossing of the Rhine River, but before that, the Hurtgen Forest had to be breached and the Roer River crossed.

V Corps was given the date of 2 November for the big push across the Roer River and on to the Rhine, and the 28th Infantry Division had been designated to be the point division. The Germans held the high ground facing the 28th Division with towns of Schmidt and Bergstein. The Germans also controlled the series of dams of the Roer River in that frontal plain vicinity, which, if damaged, could easily flood the plain area and prolong the Allied offensive until spring of the following year.

On 2 November, the 112th Infantry of the 28th Division jumped off and for two days it was under devastating German machine gun fire, mortar and heavy artillery, and in some areas, mine fields and triple concertina barbed wire. In addition, winter had set in with a vengeance. It was cold, snowy and windy. Overcast skies minimized the possibility of continuing air support.

In one of the unexplained vagaries of war, just as V Corps initiated its offensive, Field Marshall Model of the German Amy arrived at the scene to conduct a map exercise for his top staff officers and commanders. The exercise unfortunately, mirrored the planned U.S. attack; in addition, the German 272nd Volks Grenadier Division was just about to relieve the German 89th Division in the Schmidt area. Model rescinded the division relief, thereby adding to the German Model himself assumed top command and ordered an immediate counterattack. The quick and devastating German counterattack in foul weather completely stunned the tired infantrymen of the 28th Division. Confusion was rampant. The breakdown in leadership on the part of the battalion and company officers led to loss of control of the troops. Perhaps, somewhere earlier in the training of the troops, someone had been remiss and that lack of training now showed up in a lack of confidence by the troops in their leaders. The 28th Division failed to make an assertive defensive stand, and the enemy overran the area occupied by the 28th Division troops.

The Germans clearly had the upper hand, as the 28th Division was thoroughly disorganized with loss of control at company and battalion level, mounting casualties, and their inability to take any defensive measures. As the days went by, the chaos continued. General Cota, commanding the 28th Division, hastily put into action two combat engineer battalions to stem the tide of the German attack. Elements of the 110th Infantry of the 28th Division occupied the Germeter and Vossenack area. The Germans continued to pound this area with mortars, 88's, and heavy artillery, as casualties continued to mount on the American side. During the day of 6 November, there was practically a pell-mell rush through the lines of the 110th by the disorganized 112th Infantry, thereby enhancing the confusion and chaotic situation. Weapons and equipment were hastily discarded as the infantrymen tried to escape the awesome German attack. General Hodges had kept in close touch with the situation and was extremely disappointed. On 8 November, during a conference at the divisional CP attended by General Hodges, Gerow, Eisenhower and Bradley, General Cota was the subject of a brief but terse conference. On 14 November, the 2nd Ranger Battalion relieved elements of the 112th Infantry of 28th Division in the Germeter-Vossenack area. As such, the Rangers (approximately 500 strong) became the sole reserve of the 28th Infantry Division. Both towns lie situated on an open ridge. Germeter straddles the road beyond the town of Eupen, Belgium, just several miles from the Belgium-German border, and edging on the heavily wooded Hurtgen Forest. Vossenack lies several hundred yards farther to the east, on the same open ridge.

This Germeter/Vossenack area was ground that the Germans desperately needed. Germeter and Vossenack were located on the northern break-through route of Hitler's planned daring and imaginative offensive. This plan would have split the Americans from the British farther to the north, and driven a wedge into the Allied line, allowing the Germans to gain control of the town of Monschau, which was an important crossroads juncture, then also control Liège, an important railroad center and the heart of the Allied supply setup for food and fuel. Finally, the Germans would be able to gain control of Antwerp, Belgium, a major Allied port and supply base.

For these reasons, the daring Rangers were to be part of the V Corps thrust through the Hurtgen Forest, relieving the 28th Division, which had been badly battered in their attempt to hold this sector. Eventually, the Rangers would be directed towards the town of Schmidt, a vital crossroads on high ground that overlooked the important Roer River dams - the Schwammenauel, and the Urft. In the opinion of the Corps Intelligence staff, these dams could be destroyed by the Germans to flood the terrain over which the Americans must pass, thereby making a crossing of the Roer River almost impossible.

But first, the mission of the Rangers was to hold the ground around Germeter and Vossenack, which included the road connecting Aachen to the north and Monschau to the south; also to conduct patrol action searching out enemy forces and defenses, and finally, to repel all counterattacks. Before proceeding with the Rangers and their attack on Bergstein and Hill 400, we digress to complete the background of the divisional activity, and then the movements of each Ranger Company and to detail their activities during the decisive battles for the Hurtgen Forest and Hill 400.

General Gerow issued orders for the 28th Division to hold the Vossenack ridge, assist the 12th Infantry of the 4th Division to secure the line of departure between the towns of Vossenack and Hurtgen, and be prepared to work with the 5th Armored Division in a frontal drive against the Monschau corridor. On 8 November, the battered 110th Infantry regiment set out to accomplish one of Gerow's missions, namely to drive toward Monschau. For five days, two under-strength battalions of the 110th were unable to pass through the pillbox area on the way to Monschau. On that same date, 8 November, the almost full-strength 12th Infantry of the 4th Division attempted to strength the Hurtgen line of departure. During the next five days, casualties of the regiment soared into the hundreds with a considerable percentage attributed to the elements, namely trench foot and frostbite.

That attack on Schmidt developed into one of the most costly divisional attacks during the entire war. Losses in manpower, trucks, tanks and materiel were tremendous. By now, General Hodges realized the futility of the continued usage of the 28th Division, and had what was left of the division relieved by the 8th Division.

Initially, the 112th Infantry (28th Division) occupied Vossenack, and captured Schmidt. The Germans counterattacked with tanks, self-propelled guns, artillery and infantry, creating panic and disorder among the American infantrymen. The situation changed radically, as the enemy captured a large number of Americans, caused numerous casualties among the Americans, while others just simply dropped their weapons and attempted to evade the punishing enemy artillery by running to the rear.

General Gerow, Corps Commander, sent in the 12th Infantry (4th Division) to bolster the flank of the 112th. They were positioned north of Germeter on the edge of the Hurtgen Forest. Cold weather and a driving winter rain did not help the morale of the inexperienced American troops. Trench foot and casualties helped to add to the confusion that was rampant. After one month of fighting, the Americans had barely advanced twelve miles into Germany.

Finally, on 19 November, the 112th Infantry and the entire 28th Division was relieved and pulled out of the line, having suffered thousands of casualties. Schmidt was now recaptured and occupied by the Germans which was a blow to the Allied command, as the high elevation of Schmidt enabled the Germans to dominate the immediate region with miles of visibility for artillery spotting.

The American army goal was still in the direction of the Roer River and from there to the Rhine. Even though the 28th Division's foray had been a failure, V corps designated the 4th Division, assisted by the 5th Armored Division to push through the Hurtgen Forest, the villages of Kleinhau and Bergstein for the eventual crossing of the Roer River. The 4th Division soon found themselves facing the same obstacles as those of the 28th Division - severe wintry weather, relentless enemy artillery and mortar fire, enemy defensive positions within the Hurtgen Forest, and front-line troops without sufficient infantry training. Their strategy seemed to be similar to that of the 28th Division. With the aforementioned obstacles facing them, they soon suffered heavy casualties, and numerous cases of combat fatigue.

The First Army and V Corps were determined to continue with their objective, and now ordered the 8th Division to attack in a sector just south of the 4th Division area, and also towards the Roer River.

Now, General Hodges adjusted his front line troop division and corps boundaries. Two regiments of the 8th Division occupied defensive positions around Vossenack. The other regiment, the 121st Infantry was on its way from its former position in Luxembourg, some 100 miles away. As this regiment arrived in the Vossenack area just in time to join in the attack, its men were fatigued and bewildered after the lengthy journey, but they were immediately rushed into an attack situation in a strange area amid harassing enemy artillery.

The 8th Division went on the offensive and for a few days, the three regiments made every attempt to push ahead, sometimes gaining 500 yards, but other times stalemated without any gain. All of this time, the Germans from their dominant positions along the Schmidt and Bergstein high ground, continued to pound the American infantry with a steady barrage of mortar and artillery. Enemy automatic weapons fire and mine fields continued to take their toll of casualties, and equally as important, the horrible weather conditions of rain, fog, snow and freezing temperatures hampered the American advance.

Meanwhile, the German 272 Volksgrenadier Division had a strongly fortified position on Castle Hill, another high observation post that dominated the area enabling the Germans to observe the American troop movements. The 121st Infantry (8th Division) advanced through the woods in the vicinity of Brandenburg, the town closest to Bergstein at the base of Castle Hill. There, after numerous casualties and cases of combat fatigue, their forward advancement was stopped. CCR of the 5th Armored Division, with their tanks, personnel carriers and other vehicles, were road bound, in an attempt to make their way to Bergstein. Now, due to mines, self-propelled gun fire, and an extremely heavy artillery barrage, they were bogged down and suffered heavy casualties as well as their advance being stopped.

CCR of the 5th Armored Division had been attached to the 121st Infantry regiment to aid in the attack, but due to a breakdown in communications between the armored command and 8th Division engineers, the combat command withdrew. Mines and craters had disabled the lead tanks, blocking the approach of the remaining armored vehicles, and too many casualties had resulted.

Bolstered by the 13th Infantry of the 4th Division, advances were made and the town of Hurtgen was captured. It had taken nine days for the combination of infantry and armor to secure and control the Hurtgen area. The casualty rate had been high on the American side, and probably on the German side as well.

The next directive of General Hodges was for the combined task force to attack the Bergstein ridge. CCR of the 5th Armored Division was given the lead task, and on 2 December started towards their objective. Mine fields made for slow progress and difficulty for the tanks and armored vehicles to make any forward progress. Observation from the top of Castle Hill in Bergstein afforded the Germans a commanding view of this armored movement and enabled them to direct concentrated artillery and mortar fire on the advancing column. Eventually, Castle Hill would be known as Hill 400 for its height in meters.

Casualties continued to take their toll, holding up the advance of the task force. The cold rainy weather created medical problems, such as frostbite, trench foot, and combat fatigue, all of which added to the morale problems. General Weaver, commanding general of the 8th Division and commanding the task force, requested help from General Gerow, specifically asking for the 2nd Ranger Battalion to help the 8th Division in their attack in Bergstein.

December 6, General Weaver of the 8th Division, to whom the 2nd Ranger Battalion was attached, ordered the Rangers to attack and gain possession of Bergstein and Castle Hill.

When the Rangers ultimately took possession of Hill 400, and were relieved by troops of the 8th Division, essentially, the Battle of Hurtgen Forest came to an end. Three months of fighting, which included the 1st Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 5th Armored Division, 8th Infantry Division, 28th Infantry Division, 83rd Infantry Division, plus numerous special troops, most notably the 2nd Ranger Battalion, all combined to make this one of the most disastrous battles of WWII, in the number of casualties.

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