1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment (1st Infantry Division)
13 - 22 September 1944
At 1005 that morning of 19 September, Major Adams sent the following message to Colonel Seitz, commander of the 26th Infantry Regiment:
It is recommended that my Bn be returned to the unit so that I can get replacements and re-equip. My unit has suffered heavy battle casualties and yesterday and today I am beginning to get men suffering from combat fatigue. As of this AM my fighting strength was as follows: A-99, B-91, C-62, D-96. Yesterday I suffered very heavy casualties as follows: 8-KIA, 50-WIA, 57-MIA. I am still attacking today against an objective that is very difficult to take. I shall undoubtedly suffer further heavy casualties today. At the present rate I am rapidly losing my combat effectiveness. I would like to return to the outfit so that I can get my Bn back in shape. Yesterday C Co was placed on an independent mission and was caught in a trap. The Co Cdr is MIA. Lt. Emory P. Jones is in command. He has one other officer. The company has 55 MIA's.
Despite its losses, Company C continued to play a prominent role in the battle for Weissenberg: in all it conducted five attacks in fours days: three attempts to envelop Weissenberg, the attack into Diepenlinchen itself, and the final seizure of Weissenberg. On the 18th the company had reorganized, had attacked on the right flank of the Company B in its advance into Diepenlinchen, then had defended facing east that night. On the morning of the l9th it joined Company B in an attack north of Diepenlinchen that gained about three hundred meters, but was eventually beaten back. Around noon on the 19th, Company A jumped off for Weissenberg again, this time with two rifle and two tank platoons abreast. However, as the platoons deployed into the 400 meters or so of open, level ground in front of Hill 283, they evoked a deluge of fire from German weapons of every caliber, including 20mm cannon. Lt. Col. Hogan stated after the war that "I have never seen such a concentration of German artillery before or since." Both the infantry and the tanks pulled back into the woods.
At 1430 on the 19th, Brigadier General Truman E. Boudinot, commanding CCB, ordered a general coordinated attack with three prongs: Task Force Lovelady was to attack across the open meadow in concert with Company A, 26th Infantry and Company H, 33d Armor, who were to seize a foothold in the woods west of Weissenberg, and then Weissenberg itself. In Task Force Hogan, Company B was to drive deeper into the rock piles west of the factory at Diepenlinchen. Company C, 26th Infantry, with tanks attached, was once again to try to envelop the enemy from the east. Lt. Col. Hogan pointed out that he had previously considered such an envelopment, but had rejected it because his personal reconnaissance had convinced him that the ground to the southeast and east of the factory area was boggy, unsuitable for tanks.
General Boudinot nonetheless directed the attack. At about 1400 hours the remnant of Company C — at this time its fighting strength was 62 — with four tanks of Company G, 33d Armor attached, moved from position as TF Hogan reserve into the attack. As the team emerged into the open east of the town, it drew effective artillery, mortar, and antitank fire. Two tanks were hit and disabled, and the other two became mired in the soft ground. The infantry pulled back, and the tankers abandoned their vehicles [these were destroyed in place]. Company B gained several hundred meters, but Company A, facing the open ground before Weissenberg, was delayed waiting for coordination with Task Force Lovelady on its left. Momentum lost, the attack faltered.
Late in the afternoon of 19 September CCB decided to make another try at a frontal assault on the left, preceded by a 10 minute preparation by all VII Corps artillery within range, concluding with smoke to conceal the advancing infantry and tanks. Company A was forming on its line of departure — the edge of the woods opposite Weissenberg — when the preparation began. However, a number of rounds fell short, causing tree bursts in and near Company A; its soldiers promptly sought cover. A 30 minute delay was called to permit all forward observers to register on target. When the preparation resumed, however, bursts were again observed to be searching back toward the position of Company A, and tree bursts again drove the infantry to cover. The tanks (Company H, 33d Armor) jumped off on schedule, and succeeded in crossing the open area, but as they approached the woods before Weissenberg two were hit by cannon fire from the left flank, and a third was taken out from short-range by a shoulder-fired rocket. The remainder, without infantry protection, retired.
One 26th Infantry eye-witness thought that failures could be attributed to the absence of the usual 1st Division infantry-artillery team:
"The commitment of Company C at Diepenlinchen on a mission which had proved beyond the capability of a battalion earlier only resulted in further losses. The lack of its accustomed normal supporting fires on this mission materially reduced its fighting effectiveness.
"In this connection, Company A experienced similar difficulty with supporting artillery the following day when shell fire twice disorganized its attack at jump-off time. The supporting artillery consisted of 105-mm self-propelled howitzers. The artillery personnel believed the shelling received by Company A was enemy counter-fire, which sounds logical when it is recalled that the area involved had recently been occupied by an alert enemy. However, to an observer witnessing the concentration, it appeared that the shell bursts searched toward our own troops as the concentration developed. This could be understood when it is considered that the self-propelled guns were firing from muddy standing, causing the rear of the mount to sink in the mud with each round fired. Failure to adjust the piece after each round, under such circumstances, would result in each succeeding round dropping closer to our lines." A. R. Levasseur, Operations...
Lt. Col. Hogan, confronting the situation on the evening of 19 September, considered a night attack. Based on reports from prisoners indicating another counterattack on the left flank that night, he adopted instead a plan to have his tanks, after nightfall, sally suddenly into the open, there to cut loose with all guns at the woods concealing the German positions around Weissenberg, then to pull back before the German defensive fires could be called down. In the morning a deliberate tank-infantry attack, with Corps-wide artillery support, would be launched. Around midnight the tank foray was conducted, and the force withdrew without loss when the German defensive fires began.
