By Captain Francis D. Linse

ACTION 22 NOVEMBER 1944

The night 21-22 November was very quiet and no artillery fell between 2400 hours and 1600 hours. At approximately 0030 hours word was received from the battalion that a company of Rangers were on their way up to our position. Their mission was to tie on to our right flank and extend it, furnishing protection and filling the gap between Company I and the 28th Infantry on the right. The Rangers furnished the protection to the right flank and to the rear, but the gap between Company I and the 28th Infantry was never closed. Patrols were never able to make contact with the 28th Infantry. The Rangers' job of moving into position in the dark was an extremely hazardous one. Although they were given all known information pertaining to the mines, heavy casualties were suffered while moving into position. 30 32

In the morning a light rain began to fall and it got colder. This day, except for a light counterattack at about 1000 hours, was spent sweating out the artillery. After each period of exceptionally heavy shelling, a check of all the bunkers and dugouts was always made. It was very rarely that someone was not found wounded and a small portion of our troops was always kept busy escorting or carrying these men to the rear. Returning along the trail to the company rear command post during daylight hours was almost as dangerous as regaining at the forward position. The enemy had good observation from the high ridge to the east and any movement along the route back drew heavy mortar and artillery fire.

The counterattack at 1000 hours, which was made with about a squad of enemy, was engaged by fire. After about 10 minutes, the enemy ceased firing and withdrew. As this was the first reaction of the Germans other than artillery fire, it was thought that he was checking to see if the position was still occupied.

Fortunately, the days were short and darkness fell by 1800 hours. Just after dark the Ranger Company, later identified. as Company B of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, was replaced by Company C of that battalion. The Commander of Company B stated when he left that from his original strength of about sixty men he had only twenty-five left. These casualties were sustained from mines, artillery and mortar fire in a twenty-four hour period. They were certainly glad to be leaving. The rest of the night was quiet and passed without incident. 33

ACTION 23 NOVEMBER 1944

This day passed very slowly and seemed to be the most monotonous of the six that were spent in that position. The artillery, as usual, began at dawn and kept pounding all day long. By now the troops were getting accustomed to the shelling and it did not bother them as much as the first two days. On this morning a count was made of the shells falling over a two-hour period. Well over seven hundred shells had fallen; no doubt a large part were mortar. The big rounds, probably 240-mm fired from railroad guns, could be picked up and recognized a long way off. They sounded like flying boxcars and the time of flight after first heard was between 10 and 15 seconds.

Just before dark a heavy counter attack was received.

I company's right and rear were the hardest hit. At such times as this the need for communications was felt most. Captain Melton was forward with his 3rd and 1st platoons at the time. The enemy attack consisted mainly of automatic weapons and the sound of machine pistols and machine guns was a familiar one. Company I quickly returned the fire. The wire and mines served equally well against the enemy and no penetrations of the position were made. After a 30 minute firefight, the attacking force, estimated to be about a platoon, withdrew. It was later learned that there had been attacks at this time aimlessly across the entire regimental front. 34 35

The night off 23-24 November passed very quietly. Although it continued to rain, the temperature had not dropped to freezing and the troops were able to keep fairly dry and comfortable in the bunkers. With security properly posted the man were able to get a good nights rest.

ACTION 24 NOVEMBER 1944

Captain Melton and the heavy machine-gun platoon leader returned to the rear command post of Company I at about 0900 hours. Four days had passed since the attack and Captain Melton was anxious to get out of that position if possible. The constant pounding from the artillery was beginning to show its effect on the men. Major Hogan, the battalion commander, told him that he would have to hold on a little longer.

During this time the 1st and 2nd Battalions had been fighting desperately to reach the edge of the woods on the north and west of the town of Hurtgen. As called for in the original plan, C C "R" 5th Armored Division, was to make a tank assault supported by armored infantry down the GERMETER-HURTGEN road when the edge of the woods had been reached. The time was not just right for this attack, although it was learned that thanks were assembling to the rear. 36 37

Upon returning to his company, Captain Melton took along a wire team to replace the wire. Communications were always a constant problem. It was almost impossible to keep wire in, and due to the rain the radios functioned very poorly. The 536 radios were useless. However, the 300 radios did continue to work. This gave the company contact with the rear command post and battalion, but left no intercommunication within the company position. This handicap was never overcome.

At 1800 hours of call was received for Captain Melton and the heavy machine-gun platoon leader to report to the company rear at once. There they were met by a jeep and taken to the regimental command post, which was located in a former pillbox about 2 miles back in the woods. Here a detailed briefing was held, as the armored assault on Hurtgen was to take place at 0730 hours the next morning. 38

Just forward of the position now held by Company I near the bend in the main road into Hurtgen the enemy had blown a big crater. Before this assault could be launched this crater had to be breached and the road swept clear of mines to a point beyond the bend in the road.

The plan was as follows. During the night 24-25 November elements of the 12th Engineer Battalion were to clear the road of mines and built a bridge across the crater. The next morning the armor was to break out of the woods, cross the bridge and roll on into Hurtgen. The attack was to be supported by heavy artillery concentrations and the initial movement of the tanks out over the neck of woods screened by smoke.

Captain Melton and the heavy machine-gun platoon leader returned to the front line positions shortly after 2300 hours. The engineers were already there and had started to work. The building used as a rear command post by Company I afforded them some protection, and the engineers use it as a point from which to coordinate their work. This work continued all night and select by dawn the engineers had succeeded in putting a bridge across the crater and in clearing the road of mines. 39

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