Operations in the Hurtgen Forest
By Captain Kenneth A Peters
Conclusions
In none of the attacks in the Hurtgen Forest was CCR able to properly employ its tanks to the fullest advantage. This was chiefly due to the limited amount of open terrain, impassable wooded area, and the avenues which were strewn with mine fields. It must be anticipated when troops are employed against well dug in positions on terrain which limits maneuverability that excessive casualties in personnel and equipment will occur.
From the experiences developed from this bitterly contested battle, definite conclusions may be drawn. The writer believes that, in this operation calling for the employment of armor to assist the infantry units, gaps must be made in the enemy line to permit a rapid thrust of massed tanks, through the outer defenses. This had not been done. The line of departure and the road leading to the attack positions had been reported cleared by the infantry elements. The failure to clear this area resulted in extreme casualties of infantry personnel attempting to advance to the line of departure, and it did not permit the armored support to advance, because of these unforeseen obstacles. The complete lack of surprise and inability to advance rapidly and seize the initiative resulted from this error.
Tanks cannot be effectively employed without a gap or clearance through which to penetrate. This was proven by the lead tank striking a mine field 50 feet from the line of departure.
Armored units must have adequate protection when rallying or reorganizing once an objective has been taken, as they are most vulnerable during this phase.
Whenever possible, air support should be employed to effectively assault a position. Granted, this is not always possible, but the coordinated effort of armor, infantry, artillery, and air support has proven the most potent type of attack.
One of the most difficult missions for armor to perform is the holding and the defense of a position. This may be done for short periods of time, but the more effective role is that of a mobile reserve and as a counterattacking force. Casualties in personnel and equipment were relatively light in the attack on Bergstein, tremendous losses occurred in defending the objective. Infantry elements should be caused to relieve armored units as quickly as possible to insure the maximum integrity of a defensive position. Armored infantry and reconnaissance units can satisfactorily perform dismounted defensive missions, but in doing so, these skilled, technical, and specialized personnel degenerate from their primary mission for which they were trained and intended.
The employment of armor in woods is a feasible mission within the capabilities and limitations of its actions. The characteristics of armored units are best adapted if the mission warrants the firepower, maneuverability, and the incomparable shock action.
References:
- Combat Command R, 5th Armored Division After Action Report
- 5th Armored Division After Action Report
- 10th Tank Battalion After Action Report
- 47th Armored Infantry Battalion After Action Report
- First United States Army Report of Operations 1 August 1944 - 22 February 1945
