10 - 15 December 1944 - (Rhineland Campaign)
By Major John F. Staples
THE DIVISION PLAN OF ATTACK
The 83rd Division planned to attack with two regiments abreast initially. (See Map C)
The 330th Infantry was to attack on 10 December to seize Strass and then revert to division reserve after being passed through by the 5th Armored Division. (See Map C) (33)
The 331st Infantry was to attack on 10 December to seize Gey, Lendersdorf, and the west bank of the Roer in its zone. (See Map C) (34)
The 329th Infantry, upon relief of the 8th Infantry, was to attack on 12 December and seize the west bank of the Roer in its zone. (See Map C) (35)
Upon seizure of Gey the 5th Armored Division, from assembly area in vicinity of Grosshau, was to have priority of use of the road leading from Grosshau to Gey to permit it to attack to the southeast. (See Map C) (36)
The 24th Cavalry Squadron, with 83rd Reconnaissance Troop attached, was to occupy and defend a portion of the front between the 329th and 331st and would be pinched out by the attack of these two regiments. (See Map C) (37) (38)
THE REGIMENTAL SITUATION
The 331st Infantry departed from its sector in Luxembourg on 6 December for its move to the 12th Infantry sector about four (4) miles southwest of Duren in the Hurtgen Forest. Arriving about 1600, it had closed in an assembly area about half-way between Schevenhutte and Gey, Germany by 1900 hours. (See Map C) (39) (40)
During the night the final details for the relief of the 12th Infantry were completed. As the three battalions were of approximately the same strength and efficiency it was decided that the relief would be made on a corresponding unit for unit basis; namely: 1st Battalion relieve 1st Battalion, 2nd Battalion relieve 2nd Battalion, etc. It was to be made during daylight hours as it was felt that the concealment provided by the thick woods was sufficient for the necessary secrecy. a relief at night would have been extremely difficult and dangerous because of the lack of visibility, and numerous mine fields. (41) (42)
The relief was initiated at 0800 on 7 December and was nade by relieving one squad per company at a time, in order to reduce the probability of casualties from harassing artillery fire which was constantly falling in the area.
Responsibility for the area passed at 1600, with no indication that the enemy had any knowledge that a new unit had been placed in the line, shortly after the relief was completed, however, propaganda pamphlets were fired on the positions by enemy artillery. They read as follows: "You have been given a damnable Christmas present by being transferred to the famous Aachen sector, where fighting is heavier than anywhere else. The forest is cold, slippery, and dangerous. Death awaits behind every tree. Fighting in woods is hellish." If the enemy knew a relief was being conducted he had missed a wonderful opportunity to cause heavy casualties to both units. (43) (44)
The major units of the regiment were disposed as follows:
The 2nd Battalion, on the right, had its right flank about 100 yards north of the Grosshau-Gey road and near the eastern edge of the woods. Its front lines extended generally along the eastern edge of the woodd for a distance of approximately 800 yards. (See Map D)
The 1st Battalion was on the left. Its front lines curved back deeper in the woods and extended about 1300 yards where it joined the sector of the 24th Cavalry Squadron. (See Map D)
The 3rd Battalion was assembled in regimental reserve approximately 1500 yards to the rear in the center of the regimental sector.
The Regimental C.P. was initially established in the old 12th Infantry C.P. about 3000 yards south of Schevenhutte. On 9 December it was moved to a position half-way between Schevenhutte and Gey on the Schevenhutte-Gey road. The Regimental Trains were set up in Schevenhutte. (See Map C) (45) (46)
Orientation by personnel of the 12th Infantry revealed that the fighting in the area had been extremely difficult. The ground was rugged and the woods were dense except along fire breaks and in a few isolated spots. Trees and branches cut down by artillery fire had fallen to the ground and become matted, making movement extremely difficult in some areas and impossible in others. The enemy had exhibited fanatical resistance in defending from well concealed, log emplacements. This determined defense coupled with extensive use of mines and casualties caused by tree bursts from heavy, artillery fire had made every yard gained very costly. (47)
For at least a month prior to the arrival of the regiment in this area, cold weather with rain and snow had prevailed. The ground was soaked to such an extent that all but the lightest vehicles were road bound. This was particularly true of tanks in the densely wooded area where movement off the roads was impossible. There were only two roads in the area capable of handling the heavier regimental vehicles and tanks. One, the main supply route for the regiment, ran for approximately 1.5 miles out of Schevenhutte on the Schevenhutte-Duren road and then branched off onto a trail leading into Gey.
The other road ran north from Grossbau and intersected the main supply route about 1.25 miles west of Gey. Both of these roads had originally been capable of handling jeeps only, but had been improved by engineers of the 4th Division. Troughout the coming operation these roads remained muddy and slippery despite strenuous effort on the part of our own engineers. Their poor condition restricted the movement of tanks to the extent that the capture of Gey was delayed at least two days. (See Map C) (48) (49)
The cold wet weather was to introduce further difficulties in the form of "Trench Foot" and frozen feet. To combat this, one pair of clean socks were sent forward daily with the rations. Orders were issued for officers to inspect the men's feet daily and to have the men massage their feet and change socks daily. Any men with synyptoms of "Trench Foot" or frozen feet were sent to the Battalion Surgeon who determined whether or not they would be evacuated. Pyramidal tents, equipped with stoves and cots, were set up in each battalion area and the men with minor cases placed in them for treatment. The early treatment, rest, and three hot meals a day which the men received under this plan returned them to their units within two or three days. (50)
The terrain in the regimental zone was for the most part rolling.
The three key terrain features in the area were as follows:
- The hill west of Gey in the edge of the forest had a fairly steep, even slope down to within the edge of town where the slope became more gentle and oontinued on to Gey Creek. This hill provided excellent oberservation of the terrain to the east.
- The town of Gey controlled all of the roads in the area, including the road to Duren, which was the only one capable of supporting any volume of traffic.
- A ridge, running northwest and southeast about 2200 yards northeast of Gey, dominated the ground from the river to Gey and gave the enemy excellent observation of the entire area including the eastern edge of the woods. (46)
The 22nd Infantry had reported that Gey was strongly fortified. With the knowledge that the attack would be resumed in a few days, active patrolling was started inmediately to obtain all available information regarding enemy positions, As any movement, in the forward edge of the woods brought immediate response from the enemy in the. form of artillery and mortar fire, daylight patrols in thic area were out of the question. Consequently, night patrols were sent out to definitely locate enemy positions in the vicinity of Gey. These patrols reported strong enemy outposts about 300 yards from the edge of the woods extending iu a semi-circle through the western end of the town. None of the patrols had been able to penetrate the enemy positions. (52) (53) (54)
An officer-led combat patrol of approximately platoon strength, with an SCR 300 radio for communication and artillery support, was sent out to probe the woods north of Gey. The mission of this patrol was to attempt to get through the woods to a point east of Gey Creek about 800 yards north of the town for the purpose of finding a route through the woods over which tanks and infantry could move for an attack on Gey from the north. After attempting to penetrate a strongly organized enemy position in several places the patrol returned, having suffered fairly heavy casualties from "Shu" mines and enemy fire. (55)
After a study of the information available from patrols and intelligence reports plus a consideration of how costly woods fighting had been for the 4th Division, it was decided to attack initially with only one battalion plus a platoon of tanks. Considering the difficulty encountered in moving tanks on the existing roads it was felt that more than one platoon could not be employed effectively in the early stages of the attack. It was believed that a quick thrust, following heavy preparatory fires, would overrun the enemy positions and enable the assaulting units to gain the houses. The employment of more than one battalion on this battalion-size objective would over-saturate the position with troops and increase the number of casualties without gaining a corresponding increase in fire power, a tentative plan to attack: through the woods north of Gey with another battalion was abandoned in order to avoid attacking a known, strong enemy position. (56)
To overcome anticipated failures in wire communication, which is always difficult to maintain in rough terrain and under heavy artillery fire, three command radio nets were put in operation. Using SCR 584's for one net, SCR 610 's for the second, and SCR 300's for the third a communication system was established which never failed to provide at least two effective channels of communication. This plan was so effective that it was adopted as part of the regiment's standing operating procedure. (57)
For the attack the regiment had the following attachments:
- Company B 774th Medium Tank Battalion
- Company C 629th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP)
- 1st Platoon Company C 308th Engineer (C) Battalion (58)
