(1st Infantry Division) in the Attack on the Hürtgen Forest
16 November - 5 December 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
By Major Maurice A. Belisle
NARRATION ctnd.
By 0930 hours on 21 November the 16th Infantry situation cleared and Division released the 1st Battalion to regiment. Plans as outlined the previous day were put into orders and the 1st Battalion moved through the 3d east and then north toward the triangulation station and the road junction to the south but progress was slow as both battalions took a heavy shelling. By 1600 hours the 1st Battalion had A Company 100 yards south of Point #4. After the 1st Battalion had passed through the 3d Battalion and moved forward a few hundred yards, the 3d Battalion brought the 3d Platoon, 734th TDs up to fire on LAUFENBURG castle preparatory to its attack to seize it. The four 3 inch guns fired 27 rounds of APC and 20 rounds of HE into the castle without once piercing the walls of the fortress. Lt. Colonel Corley had planned his attack to start as soon as the rounds had been fired and he insisted that the attacks take place as planned - and fortunately so, because some of the Germans in the castle had been broken to the extent that they chose to be relieved of the responsibility of defending to the last man. As is customary some chose to fight longer but the 3d Battalion gained entry into the fortress and proceeded to mop up those remaining as holdouts. (31) Late in the afternoon Division ordered that the Regiment straighten out its line and tie in by the following morning.
The regiment's mission was to cover the right flank of the 18th Infantry Regiment in its attack for SCHONTAL on the morning 22 November. Coordinating with the attack of the 18th Infantry on SCHONTAL, the 1st and 3d Battalions jumped off at 0800 hours. By noon the 1st Battalion had reached the high ground just south of their objective RJ (Point #5) when they received a great amount of direct fire from MERODE. Division artillery was requested to place a TOT on the town and did so within a short time. The results were apparently quite effective. For some time the 1st Battalion received little direct fires from MERODE, however, by late afternoon the 1st Battalion received a twenty minute enemy sponsored serenade of artillery and mortar fire which they estimated to consist of some 300 rounds of high explosives. The 2d and 3d Battalions moved little as they absorbed another day of punishing mortar and artillery fire. Casualties in all Battalions were heavy again. (32)
For the past seven days the medical aid stations were extremely busy places. Casualties were flowing through the aid stations at a rate never before known in the Regiment. The company aid men performed their duties heroically as they always had. They suffered casualties too - a shell does not have a name on it: Captain Ku*by, Battalion Surgeon of the 2d Battalion marvelled at the quality of work of the company aid men under fire. He stated that dressings were so well applied up front that the majority of casualties could be dispatched to the rear without further attention at the aid station. This was particularly gratifying information because approximately a month prior to this operation the Assistant Battalion Surgeon had been replaced by a lieutenant MSC in all Battalions. This change in the Battalion medical organization brought about an immediate improvement in the evacuation of casualties from front line units to aid stations. Since the new officer was not an MD his main Job was administration and evacuation. In the forest they did a fine job of expediting and coordinating evacuation from the lines to aid station and aid station to rear. Even this increase in efficiency however could not overcome the delays brought about by local conditions — the extremely heavy casualties, lack of roads, and the shortage of medical personnel. The Regimental Surgeon was forced to request additional medical corps personnel to supplement his overworked crews. Army litter bearer teams were sent to regiment and were employed in front line evacuation of casualties. Even so, the heavy number of casualties coupled with the inability to transport by vehicle over the murky lanes allowed for much improvement. Regiment informed division of the fact that evacuation and supply problems were becoming more acute and requested that a sufficient number of "Weasels", l/4 ton tracked vehicles, be procured to alleviate worsening conditions. The regimental half-track vehicles were already being used but even these were not particularly mobile in this terrain.
M29 - WEASEL
Within a short time six "Weasels" were attached to regiment which in turn released two to eaoh battalion. Needless to say these new additions were immediately put into operation and worked days without cooling off. (33)
During the early evening hours of 22 November, Division attached elements of the 4th Cavalry Group to the Regiment for employment in a defensive role and to cover the gap on the regiments right flank - in order to release the 2d Battalion for further offensive actions in the direction of MERODE.
On the 23d of November only the 3d Battalion moved. By noon the Battalion was north of #155 and its reserve company was in contact with the 18th Infantry on the left. Early in the evening the 3d Battalion was forced to stop and button up short of hill #200. The 2d Battalion situation was unchanged from the previous day's with the exception of E Company on the right flank which had been relieved by elements of the 4th Cavalry Group. The relief was to continue the following morning and be complete by dark. As planned the 2d Battalion was entirely relieved on the 24th and pulled back for a short rest and preparation for the final push out of the forest. (34) The 2d Battalion had moved into reserve positions in the vicinity of the Regimental C.P. awaiting final orders for the MERODE push. As the Battalion C. P. Group moved into its area enemy artillery hit them before they had dug their foxholes. The artillery liaison officer was killed, the Battalion S-3 wounded, and several C.P. personnel were killed or wounded. (35)
