(1st Infantry Division) in the Attack on the Hürtgen Forest
16 November - 5 December 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
By Major Maurice A. Belisle
NARRATION
The 2d Battalion jumped off at H-Hour, precisely 1245 hours, 16 November 1944, on the heels of the air and artillery preparations. (19) Heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire opened up on the battalion as though part of our plan. Progress was extremely slow - it always is initially when hitting a prepared defensive position. It seemed as though any movement by our troops was observed by enemy observation posts. Mortar fire was particularly accurate. Trails and fire lanes were particularly dangerous. The enemy had pillboxes and emplacements so arranged that final protective fires covered all approaches. From the start it became evident that the woods must be cleared. Any by-passed area became a threat to the flanks or rear. (20) By 1700 hours the 2d Battalion had broken through the enemy's prepared defenses after knocking out pillboxes and emplacements and was approximately 500 yards in from the line of departure. The cost had been heavy in casualties, particularly from artillery and mortars, every round was a tree burst.
During the afternoon the regimental commander decided to employ the 1st Battalion on the left of the 2d Battalion to cover the draw running southwest toward SCHEVENHÜTTE. By 1830 hours the 1st Battalion had pulled abreast of, and was in contact with, the 2d Battalion. Both battalions continued to mop up enemy resistance within their areas and buttoned up for the night. (21) The events of the first day in the forest forecast a long rough battle for three or so miles before hitting the open again. The mass of enemy artillery and mortar fire received on a narrow front was indicative that the major part of enemy gun emplacements had not been destroyed by the air bombardment. The defender had every advantage in calling for supporting fires. He was waiting hidden in a camouflaged hole or bunker while the attacker walked into his prepared defensive fires. He knew every tree, bush, and trail. Our observers were able to pick no targets - there seemed to be none they fired by guess and by God, by map and by sound. From the outset everyone learned to stay out of fire lanes, particularly the junctions. Front line troops avoided them as they had the streets in AACHEN. Besides the small arms fire, mortars had them zeroed-in and continually covered them by fire. To the rear, roads, road junctions, and fire lanes were interdicted. It was found necessary to set up mortars in small clearings in the woods where available. To the rear any lengthy use of fire lanes was avoided except that of necessity certain lanes had to be used to supply units since the only road in the area ran northeast generally, somewhat in the center of the regimental zone. That one road was little more than a trail which, during this rainy season, could not take any heavy traffic. Consequently the battalions were experiencing extreme difficulty in keeping their tanks, TD's, and other vehicles up within reach when required, even at this slow rate of movement. The platoon of engineers worked around the clock to get the road in shape by morning so that the tanks and TD's could move up to their respective battalions. (22)
As the battalions continued their attack at 0800 hours, the following morning the 2d Battalion almost immediately ran into mines and wire covered by fire from pillboxes. The battalion launched a coordinated attack with its recently arrived tanks and TD's which was successful. (It is interesting to note here that in one of the pillboxes taken, the 2d Battalion discovered an American machine gun.) This was still an extension of the SIEGFRIED defenses. By 1400 hours the 2d Battalion reported breaking through the stiff resistance to their immediate front with E Company located at Point #1, however within a few minutes the enemy located the battalion and dropped intense artillery and mortar fire upon it. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion swept the woods to the left of the 2d Battalion on the west to prevent infiltration or attack by the enemy bouncing from the 16th Infantry's attack in the vicinity of HAMICH. Shortly before dark the battalions began to button up for the night with positions generally as shown on Map C. (23)
