by Generalmajor Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr Von Gersdorff
HURTGEN FOREST 2-15 Nov
The fact of the American attack was no surprise - only its timing. Observed movement of American troops in the rear of Roetgen, obviously (by pattern of air bursts) preplanned artillery fires, agent reports, and other signs led us to believe that an attack was imminent. The anticipated direction of the attack was towards Germeter and Lammersdorf. The deep penetration in the direction of Hurtgen and Vossenack assured us that the attack was headed for the roads to Duren, the Roer and the dams. Since the Army reserves were too weak we initiated a request to Army Group for troops with which to counterattack and reduce the penetration. By unusual chance both the Army Commander and his Chief of Staff were in conference with the Army Group Commander, Field Marshall Modl at Castle Schlenderhan. (See interview with Chief of Staff, Seventh German Army, 28 Nov 45, Question 27.) Army Group initially gave one battle group and later in the day released the entire 116 Pz Div whose commander Gen von Waldenburg, was present at the conference. The decisions, orders, end execution were accelerated by this chance gathering of the commanders.
The Army decided to move the bulk of the 116 Pz Div over the shortest route from Düren to Hürtgen. The counterattack itself was to be organized in the woods south of Hürtgen. Army ordered that the shoulders of the penetration - northwest of and south of Germeter - be held strongly. With the rapid advance of the Americans to the east and southeast of Vossenack parts of the 116 Pz Div were positioned around the perimeter ready to launch a concentric counterattack. Since the deep valley between Vossenack and the Brandenberg - Bergstein ridge offered us considerable protection, our greatest fears were for the axis Vossenack - Kommerscheidt -Schmidt. We expected a rapid advance in that direction to the dams. Near the Mestrenger Muehle were only week elements of the 89 Inf Div. The reconnaissance battalion of the 116 Pz Div was ordered to this point. Because the woods north and east of Vossenack prevented armored employment the tank regiment of the 116 Pz Div was sent to the vicinity of Schmidt, attached to the 89 Div. Both these forces, however, were so restricted by the air situation and by the condition of the road that they arrived too late to perform their initial tasks. The Reconnaissance Battalion, however, was successful, in coordination with the 89 Inf Div, in retaking the Mestrenger Muehle and thereby severing the connection between your leading elements and those in Vossenack. At this time Army ordered LXXIV Corps to launch two attacks. The first attack, employing the 89 Inf Div,reinforced with the tank regiment of the 116 Pz Div, and assault gun brigade (15 guns) was to retake Schmidt and Kommerscheidt.
The second attack, employing the remainder of the 116 Pz Div, was to be a concentric squeeze on Vossenack. All possible support - artillery, assault guns and heavy weapons - were given to these attacks. The divisional artillery of the 272 VG Div, less one battalion, was displaced to the north and added its fires. This artillery disposition was ordered by the Corps artillery commander.
The first part of the mission given to LXXIV Corps can be considered successful. By 7 Nov the Corps had destroyed the American forces which had gotten to the vicinity of Schmidt. After heavy fighting in both Schmidt and Kommerscheidt the American tanks had been destroyed and the infantry could only pass individually back through the woods to Vossenack. The three most important reasons for our success in this engagement were; the steepness of your supply route from Vossenack to Kommerscheidt, the availability to us of roads capable of supporting an armored attack, and the effective massing of our artillery fire.
The second part of the mission was not so successful. The 116 Pz Div was able to reach the church in Vossenack but they could neither capitalize on nor retain this advantage. Without armored support, operating on open ground which left us at the mercy of aircraft and artillery, lacking reserves, and facing an excellent, spirited defense, our attack could go no further. In spite of heavy artillery support repeated assaults, made no success. When we saw that our attack to cut off the penetration had no chance of completion we ordered that the troops establish a defense along the edge of the woods. In this process the 116 Pz Div was replaced by parts of of the 89 Inf Div and the 275 VG Div. The Pz Div then assembled near Hurtgen in preparation for a new attack, designed to go along the Hurtgen - Germeter road to the edge of the woods south of Germeter. Such an attack would cut off the Vossenack bulge. The tank regiment was to remain east of the Kall while the two pz gren rgts and the assault gun brigade were moved to Hurtgen.The artillery displaced to support the new attack. All elements of the 275 VG Div which were in the zone of attack became attached to the 116 Pz Div.
The American renewal of the attack on 7 Nov had been stopped by the effective use of extensive minefields, by the artillery, and by the employment of a mortar battalion. When the 116 Pz Div launched its attack southwest of Hurtgen on 10 Nov it met a new American Division, the 4th, which was also attacking. The arrival of this unit was a surprise to us. The Pz Div was successful in stopping the attack of the new American forces but could not effect a breakthrough. The attack of the 116 Pz Div in the woods succeeded in pinching off the salient of the American troops but we were unable to prevent your withdrawal to the south. The American troops could pass through the thick woods undetected. The special character of forest fighting was illustrated in another episode east of the Germeter - Hurtgen road. Here an American attack was launched along a division boundary into the woods south of Hurtgen. There the enemy established a defensive position which after repeated attempts we could not reduce. The 89 Inf Div considered the ejection of this force to be a point of honor, but they were never able to dispose of them. This typically confused example of forest fighting may be likened to a contest of "cat and mouse".
