THE ATTACK OF THE 3RD BATTALION, 517TH PARACHUTE
INFANTRY REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM (SEPARATE)
IN THE VICINITY OF BERGSTEIN, GERMANY
4-8 FEBRUARY 1945. (RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
INFANTRY REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM (SEPARATE)
IN THE VICINITY OF BERGSTEIN, GERMANY
4-8 FEBRUARY 1945. (RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
By Capt. Roland L. Gohmert
LESSONS
- Units whose tactical unity has been lost due to the decreased strength of men and leaders should be committed only in a dire emergency.
- Units should be committed only in the zone of the superior to which they are attached.
- Attacks on fortified positions should be conducted only after extensive planning and reconnaissance by the attacking unit.
- Daylight reconnaissance by leaders, down to and including the squad, must be conducted before a night attack.
- Specialized units, such as airborne, should be adequately reinforced when committed as regular ground infantry.
- A surprise attack, once launched, should be exploited to the utmost regardless of initial losses, as subsequent losses will be much greater once the enemy is on the alert.
- It is suicidal for a small unit to attack a strongly fortified position with both flanks exposed.
- Gains will inevitably be lost if the attacking force is not strong enough to cope with the enemy's reserve.
- The slightest violation of signal security can, produce disastrous results.