By Capt. Roland L. Gohmert

THE ATTACK

Approximately one hour before dark, the mortar platoon closed in the town and dug in their gun positions behind the highest point of the center hill top in town. As the battery was registered the enemy immediately retaliated with countermortar fire. Just after dark the new battalion CP was opened in Bergstein and wire communications were established to both battalion rear and regiment. Shortly after 2300 all troops had closed into the town, I Company moved to its forward assembly area in the eastern outskirts, and G and H Companies lined up in preparation for the attack. By 2355 only F Company and the battalion command group of the 2nd Battalion had come up abreast on the right, but in spite of this, it was decided to jump off on schedule.

At exactly 2400 the leading elements of G and F Companies, abreast, passed the line of departure. Rain was falling heavily and visibility was absolute zero, despite the white arm bands worn by all troops. Contact could be maintained only by each man holding to the shoulder of the man ahead. This necessitated the column formation being completely closed. Before the rear elements of H Company had cleared the line of departure, someone at the head of the column set off a trip flare lighting up the entire area. Immediately, enemy machine guns opened up from several points. This fire was apparently final protective fire, and due to the ground formation at that point, most of it passed harmlessly overhead. As the troops deployed, most control was lost, however H Company moved up on the right of G Company, and an attempt was made to continue the attack. At this time a machine gun, from a pillbox at the edge of the road where it entered the woods, opened up with aimed fire and several casualties were sustained. The lead scout of H Company finally succeeded in dropping a grenade into the embrasure, and all occupants of the pillbox were either killed by its fragmentation or as they fled from the rear door. This seemed to cause increased machine gun fire from all directions and it was discovered that fortifications were emplaced in depth on both sides of the Kall. (22)

Enemy small caliber mortar fire began to fall at this time and leaders attempted to get their units forward and out of the fire. Both physical and radio contact with the 2nd Battalion had been lost by this time and control of organic elements became increasingly difficult. The battalion commander went forward to find that both companies had entered a concentrated anti-personnel minefield and were suffering casualties in every attempt to move forward. Deciding that further attack in the dark was hopeless for the time being, he ordered a withdrawal back into town. Upon reaching the outskirts of town it was learned from the 2nd Battalion commander that he too had ordered a withdrawal, but that the F Company commander with his leading platoon were not accounted for.

While their battalions reorganized, the two battalion commanders contacted the regimental commander and it was decided to continue the attack after an artillery preparation. However, in connection with the new attempt, it was decided that the 3rd Battalion would follow the road out of town to the north (Route B) leading to objective three, as little fire had been detected from that area. The 2nd Battalion was to continue according to the original plan. In the meantime the 1st Battalion had occupied Hill 400 with little effort.

It was learned that there would be some delay in getting fires from Division and Corps Artillery, so it was decided to continue the attack after a ten minute preparation from the organic 460th FA Battalion, Although the F Company commander was still unaccounted for, permission was granted from the 2nd Battalion to fire artillery anywhere north of route A. Accordingly, a ten minute battalion preparation was fired in the new area of the 3rd Battalion, as close in as the hill mass would allow. The battalion mortars were not used in this preparation because of the possibility of drawing counterbattery near the line of departure. (23)

After the action, it was learned that in the initial assault, the F Company commander had succeeded in finding a gap through the enemy defenses on both sides of the Kall and had led his leading platoon to the high ground just south of the junction of the Roer and Kall. He then deployed his men in that area, and since his radio operator had been killed and the radio was destroyed, he sent the platoon leader back to guide the remainder of the 2nd Battalion, which he thought was close behind, through the gap. The platoon leader, a recent replacement, managed to return and reported to the battalion commander. However, due to battle fatigue or some other unexplained cause, he reported at that time that he had become lost from the company commander and his platoon in the initial fire fight and did not know where they were. Therefore, as it was learned later, when the 3rd Battalion called for the artillery concentration all members of the platoon were either killed or wounded. The company commander, himself painfully wounded, gathered the survivors to the bank of the Roer River, where they were ultimately captured. (24)

At approximately 0430, the 3rd Battalion once again crossed the line of departure in another attempt to break through the stubborn enemy defenses. This attempt led to a situation not unlike the first, and although two more fortified positions were destroyed, the extensive minefield proved to be a most effective barrier in the dark. As it was now becoming daylight it was decided to wait until it was light enough to possibly probe a path through the mines. However, daylight only brought more aimed and high angle fire to bear on the exposed troops. Due to his exposed position, the G Company commander then asked permission to withdraw his troops. This permission was denied, since higher headquarters had ordered any gains to be held at all costs. The company commander then asked permission to push forward through the mines which was also denied, as the battalion commander realized it would be futile to proceed until the engineers could clear a gap. Finally, the desperate G Company commander, unwilling to leave his troops exposed to this fire and suffer greater casualties, announced to the battalion commander that he had ordered his company to withdraw back into town. H Company, thus exposed on both flanks, was then ordered to withdraw. The G Company commander disposed his troops in defensive positions on the outskirts of town and then asked the battalion commander to be relieved of this command which was granted. (25)

Heavy concentrations of enemy artillery and mortar fire fell in Bergstein until noon after which it subsided to fire more of a harassing nature. Our own fires also increased in intensity all day. The artillery liaison officer and battalion S-2, with a composite patrol, went forward to a vantage point and adjusted fire on many emplacements with good results. It was learned that the 310th Infantry of the 78th Division, on the right across the Kall, had made little progress.

Late in the afternoon the wooded area to the front was smoked and the attached engineer platoon moved forward together with I Company and succeeded in clearing a narrow gap through the minefield about midway between routes A and B. Mine clearing was extremely slow and dangerous as the mines were all of the non-metallic type, and were sown more thickly than had yet been encountered by the battalion. The enemy, apparently thinking the smoke to be a screen for a full scale attack, reacted violently with fire of all types. As darkness fell, a platoon of I Company moved through the minefield, marking the path with engineer tape as they went. They reconnoitered the northern banks of the Kall until they found a suitable crossing and then passed to the south bank toward objective three. Due to a heavy fog, visibility was as poor as the night before and little could be accomplished by the reconnaissance.

In the meantime H Company had moved up behind the remainder of I Company at the entrance to the gap in the minefield. The reconnaissance platoon from I Company continued to probe the defenses south of the Kall and, although they overran several small groups of Germans in the dark, most of the enemy fortifications remained strangely silent. The I Company commander who had been keeping in touch with the situation decided to take the rest of the company through, and he was promptly followed by H Company. H Company moved into position on objective two and I Company was moving to the Kall when both companies were suddenly struck by a counterattack. Germans and Americans intermingled in the dark and control was lost by both sides. Hand to hand combat between individuals had reached a violent pitch when the German commanders could be heard shouting orders to withdraw. During the fight elements of both sides had gradually worked back into the minefield. (26)

The situation then became relatively quiet as the Germans attempted to evacuate their casualties, and the leaders of G and H Companies were able, to a certain extent, to reorganize and consolidate positions on objective two. As soon as the German withdrawal had been completed, mortar fire began to fall on I Company, and at dawn the enemy again counterattacked. As movement of I Company was restricted by the minefield, the counterattack was beaten off only after heavy casualties occurred, including the I Company commander who was killed by a mine while attempting to remove a wounded officer from the minefield. By this time, the attached corps litter bearer teams (these were habitually attached by corps) had themselves all become casualties, so the major part of G Company was organized into litter bearer teams and the evacuation of casualties took most of the morning. H Company with the aid of the LMG and 81mm mortar platoons held off a second counterattack while the casualties were being evacuated.

Severe German mortar fire continued to fall throughout the morning and several more of the few remaining leaders were killed including the liaison officer from the 460th FA Battalion. During the morning, the battalion commander observed a German mortar battery in operation behind a building marked with a red cross in Brück Hetzingen. He was reluctant to call for fire on the mortars for fear of hitting the aid station, but as he pondered the situation an ambulance drove to the front of the building and unloaded ammunition, which was carried into the building. This removed any doubt from his mind and after only two rounds for adjustment of his own mortars, the battery was silenced. (27)

The regimental commander ordered objective two held if possible, and ordered the 1st Battalion to attack after dark, capture Zerkall, then turn south. When contact with the 3rd Battalion was made, both battalions would continue south abreast, 3rd on the right. It was hoped that the two battalions could push through to link up with the 2nd Battalion, thus clearing all enemy north of objective one. Two prisoners captured early that morning had identified their unit as the 6th German Parachute Regiment, and gave indications that all German forces would soon withdraw across the Roer.

As all concerned wishfully thought over this information, the Germans once again counterattacked the position of H and I Companies with an estimated battalion. At about 1600 the two companies, each by that time less than a platoon in strength, were ordered to withdraw through the gap under a smoke screen. During the counterattack each company lost an SCR-300 radio, with operator, and it was not known whether the radios had been captured intact. When the withdrawal was complete, all available artillery and mortar fire was thrown into the area. As darkness approached on the evening of the 7th, G and H Companies moved back toward objective two, but it was soon discovered that the enemy had resown the mines in the gap and had re-occupied the previously knocked out pillboxes. The two companies soon broke through again, however, and by 2000 had retaken objective two. The 1st Battalion, in the meantime, had reached Zerkall but was under counterattack and was unable to make further progress. The 2nd Battalion on the right was also held up by heavy resistance. (28)

Realizing that it was futile to leave the two small forces exposed on objective two, G and H Companies were ordered to withdraw to Bergstein on the morning of 8 February, where they took up defensive positions.

It was soon discovered that the Germans had at least one captured radio in use, as they frequently attempted to issue false orders to units of the battalion.

At approximately 1000 hours, a force estimated to be a platoon of Germans approached the middle of the open area approximately 500 yards south of town and began digging in, apparently oblivious to the situation around them. The mortar platoon, with the gunners observing their own fire, soon eliminated the entire force.

The 78th Division launched an all out coordinated attack on Schmidt on the morning of the 8th, preceded by a P-38 air strike and heavy artillery bombardment. At approximately noon, great numbers of enemy could be seen withdrawing on the Schmidt - Brück - Hetzingen road. The 78th Division gave the 517th permission to fire on these troops, and in a matter of minutes all the mortars of all three battalions were in action. Vehicles were knocked out, blocking the road, and a great many casualties were observed. (29)

Orders were received early in the afternoon that the regiment was being relieved by the 508th Parachute Infantry. Although wire communications existed to all companies by this time, to top off the entirely unfortunate preceding events, an officer in the battalion CP radioed all units, in the clear, to move out of position and form on the road fifteen minutes after darkness. As the troops began to leave town, a heavy enemy concentration covered the road. Three of the remaining ninety-six officers and men of the 3rd Battalion were hit, and the others escaped only by their expeditious advance to the rear.

At a later date the G-3 of V Corps told the combat team commander that although the 517th did not physically occupy the assigned objectives, the desired diversionary effect was accomplished. The Germans prematurely committed the bulk of their reserves in the 517th area, thus relieving pressure from the main effort at Schmidt. (30)

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