IN THE THIRD BATTLE OF AACHEN
16 November to 3 December 1944

By Gerhard Engel, Generalleutnant a.D.

29 November

Even on 29 November the front was held in spite of strong attacks. The LXXXI Corps informed the division of the arrival of the 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division from Holland. Its personnel was outstanding; its strength exceeded that of an authorized Army division. The corps planned to relieve the 12. Infanterie-Division (GE) with the 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division. The 12. Infanterie-Division (GE) way to be reorganized and assigned elsewhere. The attacks that day were greatly repelled. The MLR ran from an area east of Frenzerburg - east of Langerwehe - east of Jüngersdorf to an area southeast of Merode. In the evening the first units of a regiment of the 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division were inserted near Jüngersdorf to support the 47. Volksgrenadier Division. Unfortunately one battalion was hit by an American attack. Since the unit was unaccustomed to battle, it suffered serious losses by artillery and tank fire.

30 November

During the night of 30 November more units of the 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division were inserted in the front. The 5th and 9th Fallschirmjäger Regt were placed under "Group Engel". They were committed to the sector of the 47. Volksgrenadier-Division. at Jüngersdorf and Merode, because the units of the 47. Volksgrenadier-Division there were completely exhausted. In the Frenzerburg area the front of the 12. Infanterie-Division (GE) was temporarily quiet, in the flat meadows, barely hidden in trenches both sides faced each other at the distance of a hand grenade's toss. Some American tanks were disabled, eliminating armored attacks for a while. The terrain was suitable for tanks, except that it offered no cover.

1 December

Still more units of the 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division were inserted in the front of the 12. Infanterie-Division (GE) on 1 December, permitting the withdrawal of the first units of the Füsilier-Regiment 27 and the Füsilier-Battalion 12, which was under it. The Grenadier-Regiment 48, which had been transferred from the 246th Volksgrenadier Div since 28 November to form the corps reserves, was assigned to the division. Heavy fighting continued on 1 December at Frenzerburg, which was defended by units of the Grenadier-Regiment 89 and the 5th Fallschirmjäger Regt. At the farm there both sides were only 20 meters apart. Northward toward Lamersdorf the enemy started violent attacks and captured the village by evening. In the 3d Panzer Grenadier Div sector heavy fighting was waged for Inden as the Americans tried to force a crossing over the Inde. In the evening a withdrawal to the D-line to the strong point of Lucherberg was ordered. The village, which had been carefully fortified, was situated higher than the surrounding area and offered a strong natural bastion. Flanked by high slopes, it was to be the cornerstone of the front in the battles to come. During the night the remainder of the Füsilier-Regiment 27 and some of the artillery were taken out of the front. Relief by the untried airborne division was successfully accomplished. As usual, with the fall of night, the Americans discontinued combat activity, and even ground reconnaissance.

2 - 3 December

Intense battle continued in the 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division sector at Inden through 2 December. On the 12. Infanterie-Division (GE) sector through Lamersdorf toward Lucherberg the pressure increased. At 2000 the sector was taken over by the 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division. The Grenadier-Regiment 89 which after the loss of Frenzerburg was operating in the D-line near Lucherberg, and one artillery battalion of the 12th Arty Regt were to remain in their positions until relieved by the 3rd Regt of the 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division. The regiment arrived during the night of 2 - 3 December, and the Grenadier-Regiment 89 was withdrawn.

GENERAL REMARKS

The third battle near Aachen had reached its climax, but its end could not yet be seen. At this point the 12. Infanterie-Division (GE), in spite of the fact that it was so fully committed and other difficulties, was ordered to withdraw from the front and reorganize its personnel and materiel for another assignment. As a battle-tried, western front division, it was to be employed in one of the main thrusts of the Battle of the Bulge. But even without this new mission the division needed relief, for after 17 days, of major fighting, it was completely exhausted. In the infantry all regiments were worn out, having had no personnel replacements during the battles; the companies had a combat strength of 15 to 20 men at most.

Experience both at the Eastern and Western front had proved it unwise to combine units, for only by maintaining the cadres, however small, was it possible to reorganize. The total strength of the infantry regiments including the medium guns was between 200 and 300 men.

The casualties of the division since 16 November totaled 2,500 men, wounded and killed. The numbers of men missing in action, however, was strikingly low. The artillery was intact more than the other units. The 12 batteries averaged 3 barrels fit to fire. Except for the painful losses among the observation posts, the casualties here were also low.

Of 20 assault guns the antitank units had left 6 unable vehicles. The antiaircraft company was completely intact, but the antitank company had only 2 of 12 antitank guns fit for operation. The ammunition supply had been good almost every day. In spite of constant crises every night it had been possible to move up ammunition, notably because of the self-sacrificing efforts of the motor transport company and the horse-drawn vehicle troops. Regardless of the uninterrupted harassing fire that frequently covered the roads, crossroads and approach roads near the front, these units transported ammunition and other supplies to the front.

On the average the batteries had from four to seven hundred rounds at their disposal each day. This supply was maintained, in spite of the fact that after 28 November a Volksgrenadier artillery corps, a valuable support for our artillery, was operating in the area of "Group Engel." There had been no air support whatsoever. Not until the last day of operations, 2 December, did there appear a few jet fighters, which were irrelevant to the defense.

SUMMARY

During the third battle near Aachen, which began on 16 November, an unprecedented quantity of materiel was expended. Aware of the fact that they defended the soil of their native country, the German troops accepted this fight with generally high morale, fully ready and willing to defend themselves in spite of all previous shocks and drawbacks.

The beginning of the battle soon showed that this was not a major fight between men in the front lines, but one of materiel. The German troops would not have been expected to succeed in defending themselves had it been known before that such a tremendous amount of weapons and ammunition would be used by the enemy.

On the German side, too, the fight was not characterized by the infantry. Although the means were insufficient, the fights had to be carried out with materiel. Thus the third battle of Aachen was a large-scale artillery battle.

With full appreciation for the heroic fighting of the infantry, it must be concluded that in practically all cases the success of defense was achieved through the artillery. Under strict and skillful direction the artillery smashed enemy assemblies; with well-controlled barrage fire it stopped enemy attacks; during the last days of fighting it halted attacks with direct fire. In this battle the enemy failed to attain the expected objective -a breakthrough to the Rhine.

Through shrewd estimates and analysis of the situation the points of the enemy's main effort were deduced. The direction of the attacks developed as expected: on both sides of the Eschweiler -Weisweiler autobahn, south toward Eschweiler - from the Gressenich area - from Schevenhütte toward Langerwehe -toward Merode, the shortest way to the plain and the Roer between Jülich and Düren.

(signed)
Gerhard Engel