IN THE THIRD BATTLE OF AACHEN
16 November to 3 December 1944
By Gerhard Engel, Generalleutnant a.D.
16 November
On 16 November, a cloudless, sunny fall day, enemy drum fire began suddenly at 1100 along the entire front. The MLR, fire positions, village entries, and crossroads were covered by an ever-increasing fire. Our artillery, which immediately returned the fire, was soon deprived of its most important limb - the observation posts. Beside the drum fire, an unprecedented volume of smoke-screening fire lay a screen over our observation posts forcing the artillery to resort to the less effective, though thorough "fixed plane of fire." Simultaneously with the drum fire began the air bombardment, which had been redirected from operations against the homeland. Over the 15 km division sector about 5,000 4-engine bombers swarmed between 1100 and 1300. They threw 500 or 1,000 kilogram of bombs over various sections of the MLR, particularly batteries and command posts. Some village entries, such as Luchem and the narrow crossroads at Langerwehe were covered with bombs and blocked by the rubble of house ruins. In spite of this unique gigantic aerial bombardment, our losses of personnel and materiel were rather low. Some guns were destroyed; in some places the losses in the batteries or command posts were rather great; but no unit was lost entirely nor was the command systematically paralyzed. However, the telephone net suddenly failed to work, but the division immediately switched to radio.
At 1245 2 tank-supported infantry attacks began along the entire front with spearheads at Duffenter against the Füsilier-Regiment 27, toward Werth-Hastenrath against the Grenadier-Regiment 89 and toward Gressenich against the Grenadier-Regiment 48. Two American combat groups were gradually recognized: the 3rd Armored Division (U.S.) and 104th Infantry Division (U.S.) against Donnerberg, and the 3rd Armored Division (U.S.) and 1st Infantry Division (U.S.) against Gressenich. The latter attack was especially strong. About noon the fire of smoke-screen shells increased, resulting in a almost complete screening of the observation posts. Yet this screening gave the enemy only a slight advantage for the three main points of the attack — Donnerberg-Werth-Hastenrath and Gressenich — were known. During the afternoon the first reports of the regiments arrived; at the same time special missions staff officers returned from the front with the data that clarified the enemy's situation somewhat. The enemy was attacking stubbornly everywhere with strong forces. Flame-thrower tanks and so-called tankdozer tanks, which plowed over foxholes, burying the riflemen, were being used. But the enemy had suffered great losses because of the mine fields and other explosives in the areas which had not been reconnoitered before the battle.
By evening most of the MLR had been held in spite of great losses. The entire right sector of the Füsilier-Regiment 27, which was most difficult to attack had been held. Penetration in the Grenadier-Regiment 89 sector at Werth had been slight. The Grenadier-Regiment 48 had borne the severest attacks and had lost Koetenich and Gressenich. Late in the afternoon the Grenadier-Regiment 89 had recaptured Werth.
The planned relief of the 12. Infanterie-Division (GE) during the night by the 47. Volksgrenadier-Division, which had been transferred from Denmark, was to prove of no significance. The 47. Volksgrenadier-Division's Grenadier-Regiment 103, which had been the first to move into the Düren area, was located in the Weisweiler area when the attack started. In order to take position in the central sector. Guide parties of the 47. Volksgrenadier-Division were already in the front position.
A smooth relief seemed guaranteed. But the start of the attack made it impossible for the relief to be carried out in the manner planned. The 5th Panzer Army Headquarters under General der Panzer von Manteuffel, which also was to be relieved, was ordered to remain by the Army Group. Along with this order the relief of the 12. Infanterie-Division (GE) was canceled.
The 47. Volksgrenadier-Division was committed to the left sector or the 12. Infanterie-Division (GE). This was a difficult task because of the impact and strength of the attacks and the fact that the front line was already being shifted. To make matters worse, the 47. Volksgrenadier-Division, which had no combat experience, was attacked by planes while it moved into the Düren area. The Grenadier-Regiment 103 was first placed under the 12. Infanterie-Division (GE). During the night the regiment was ordered to move up to the Bovensberg forest area to back the dangerous situation in the Werth-Gressenich area. Because it had no combat experience and was unaccustomed to night movements, the regiment did not reach the assembly area and could not be employed until the following night.
17 November
On 17 November the enemy attacked in the same areas and with the same spearheads as on the preceding day.
His fighting power had not been affected by the infantry casualties or the loss of a large number of tanks (radio monitors had picked up reports or painful losses of tanks by mines). The division knew definitely that the two groups now attacking included the 3rd Armored Division (U.S.) and the 1st and 104th Infantry Division (U.S.). The attacks were weaker than the day before, and were all repulsed. The MLR remained firmly in our hands, but Gressenich could not be recaptured and Werth was again lost by the Grenadier-Regiment 89. After violent house to house, hand to hand fighting, the village of Scherpenseel was held.
On the second day, however, our losses were greater. The most violent attacks had again been in the central and left sectors of the Grenadier-Regiment 89 and Grenadier-Regiment 48. As a result, the division committed the Füsilier-Battalion 12 from the reserves between the two regiments in the general line from the southern edge of Gressenich Mill to Hill 232. Thus a narrower combat sector for the two regiments compensated somewhat for their losses. By evening reports to the corps indicated that the defense power was still strong and the morale still high; the MLR was in our hands. Enemy activity indicated that the attack could certainly be continued in the following day. Reports still indicated that the enemy intended to attack on both sides of the toad Schevenhütte - Langerwehe in order to reach the large road Eschweiler - Düren. He would continue the attack toward Scherpenseel-Hastenrath to occupy the plateau southeast of Eschweiler and thereby control the area west of the Roer between Jülich and Düren.
The LXXXI Corps ordered the MLR held and announced plans to recapture Gressenich and the plateau on both sides with units of the 116. Panzer-Divisionision, which were moving from Holland. Pointing to the great losses it had suffered, the division was able to dissuade the corps from its plan to pull out the 2. Sturmpanzerkompanie, which had arrived but had not been employed.
18 November
On 18 November the expected major attacks began. The division had employed at Scherpenseel some units of the Grenadier-Regiment 103, which had already suffered losses from artillery fire. Thus the Grenadier-Regiment 89, which was ordered to hold the southern edge of Hastenrath and the big slopes to the west , was able to man its sector more closely. During the day the Americans gained more ground, particularly on the division's left wing, where the pressure was strongest on units of the Grenadier-Regiment 104 of the 47. Volksgrenadier-Division. The regiment had been moved up during the night. (This regiment was also under the 12. Infanterie-Division (GE) at first) East of Gressenich the enemy gained more ground toward Hamich; on the southern edge of the town battles were raging as early as the noon. During the day this village was also lost after bitter house to house fighting and a brave defense of the Grenadier-Regiment 48. In the Wenau forest strong enemy forces engaged units of the 104th Grenadier Regiment in bitter fighting. By noon there was again pressure against the central sector in the area of Hastenrath towards Eschweiler.
The enemy artillery had been strengthened. Fighter bombers exercised uninterrupted control of the MLR and silenced the batteries considerably. Marauder formations saturated the MLR and nearby villages with bombs halting completely any shifts and movements by day. In the evening after having taken the village of Hamich, the enemy launched an attack against Hill 232 which lasted into the night; the attack was supported by a tremendous concentration of artillery fire. The fusilier battalion held the height in spite of heavy losses.
The report to corps that evening left no doubt about the seriousness of the events of the day. Losses had become even more crucial. Ammunition for artillery and medium guns had almost been expended, but the transportation of supplies at night was still good, contrary to expectations. The division requested tank support, for if the major attacks continued, the threat of a breakthrough, especially on the left sector, would become more and more menacing. However, the corps replied that it still intended to relieve the division in the left sector, that the complete withdrawal of the Grenadier-Regiment 48 could be expected soon. Meanwhile, the 116. Panzer-Division had arrived and its "Combat Team Baier" would move into the Jüngersdorf - Merode area during the night and be placed under the 12. Infanterie-Division (GE).
The team consisted of a Panzer company, an armored infantry battalion, an artillery battalion and an antiaircraft battery, which was to be used for ground fighting. These forces were to be used in a counterattack toward Gressenich the next day. It was planned to recapture first the village of Hamich and the nearby plateau with the Baier Panzer Company and armored infantry battalion, and the mounted infantry of the Grenadier-Regiment 48. If this attack was successful it was to be continued toward Gressenich. After a discussion with the leader of the combat team, Colonel Baier, the start of the attack was set for morning. The exact time depended on the arrive of the combat team, which was to move up through the Langerwehe - Heistern area. The 47. Volksgrenadier-Division, which had committed the bulk of the 103rd and 104th Grenadier Regiments to the front, was to take over the command of the left sector of the 12. Infanterie-Division (GE). The 47. Volksgrenadier-Division had established a continuous front, the Grenadier-Regiment 48 was to be hurriedly withdrawn to form the corps reserve.
