in the Attack on Kesternich
30 January - 1 February 1945 - (Rhineland Campaign)
By Captain John H. Barner
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
1. INFANTRY-TANK COORDINATION
The most obvious deficiency which attracts our attention throughout this operation is the lack of adequate communication, understanding, and confidence between tanks and infantry. During the initial minutes of the attack tank communication with F Company failed, making it necessary for an infantry platoon leader to expose himself on a tank deck in order to gain their support. Again during the second day of the attack an identical situation developed when communication failed between the reserve platoon of tanks which had just been committed and E Company. In this case it was necessary for the 2d Battalion Commander and E Company Commander to mount the tanks and direct their fire support.
We should expect to have electrical means of communication fail during operations however it would have assisted all concerned if the tank commanders had unbuttoned and observed for arm and hand signals after their radios failed to function. This was not done. Such action would not have been fully effective for the reason that the tank crews did not know the meaning of the standard signals used until after the brief "course" they received from the Battalion Commander during the lull in operations on 29 January.
In general it appears that the infantry knew and executed their missions for an infantry-tank assault, which includes clearing lanes through anti-tank mine fields and silencing anti-tank weapons. A platoon leader of F Company placed a bangalore charge during the first day of the attack to clear a lane for the tank platoon supporting his company. During the first night after the attack began, patrols were sent forward to clear and mark lanes through the anti-tank mine fields. Smoke was used to blind enemy observation thus rendering direct fire anti-tank weapons ineffective. However, the tanks failed in their mission -- the elimination of automatic weapons which cause infantry casualties but are ineffective against tanks. One tank commander reported that he was "unable" to find a firing position. An entire day of fighting resulted in the platoon of tanks attached to F Company offering fire support on two occasions only.
Written observations of the Commanding Officer, 311th Infantry Regiment concerning this important point were caustic and pointed. In part they read, "Failure of supporting tanks to come forward after the way was cleared by infantry resulted in one days delay. The enemy reinforced with anti-tank guns at night. When tank communication fails they should unbutton. * * * * A tank unit that is not aggressive is a detriment to the infantry." 85
To prevent this analysis from developing into another bitter denunciation of tanks in general by an infantryman, it is necessary to ferret out the actual causes of the situation just described. The writer believes that criticism of this company should be tempered by the fact that this attack was the initial combat action for the tanks. This is not an excuse, however, for the Tank Company Commanders reticence to engage his tanks in any action where they might have been fired upon. For example his objections to commitment of the reserve tank platoon. Additionally, a basic tactical error was made by the tanks on the second day of the attack when the reserve platoon adopted a line of sections formation to offer fire support for an infantry attack. Some formation allowing all tanks to fire frontally should have been used for this action.
After carefully examining all the factors noted above it appears that the lack of pre combat training for the tank company caused most of the failures during this attack.
2. CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK
E Company was not committed early enough during the first morning of the attack. The forward momentum of both F and G Companies was lost while waiting for E Company to move into the line. Although some of this delay was due to heavy enemy mortar fire, the actual order for E Company to move forward could have been issued earlier. The Battalion Commander attributes this delay to the fact that he did not move forward far enough to observe the action but relied on radio reports from the companies. In some instances these reports were sketchy and inaccurate. In the words of the Battalion Commander, "this never happened again in the 2d Battalion". The value of this observation Is further enhanced when it is compared to E Company's assault at the town triangle during the second day of the attack. Here the Battalion Commander and his command party were in a position to observe the progress of the attack. When it was apparent that the lack of participation by the tanks might jeopardize the success of the attack the Battalion Commander was in a position to take immediate corrective action.
Another comparison can be made which clearly indicates how the conduct of an attack by different command techniques may produce varying degrees of success. During the first day of the attack E Company gained their initial objective where they took up a defensive position although their final objective was still to be secured. On the other hand, during the second day of the attack, E Company continued to plod through heavy enemy resistance which had been reinforced during the night. This can be attributed to the actions of the new E Company Commander, the former executive officer, who consistently moved with his assault platoons where he could make adjustments such as reinforcing the 1st Platoon when its strength became low.
Another benefit occurred to the commanders who physically conducted their attack on the ground. As the men saw their commanders around they gained confidence and pressed the attack with a vigor which may not have been present if these commanders had not made their presence known. It would be impossible to estimate the morale effect on the men of E Company as they saw their Battalion Commander moving along the line during the first day of the attack.
3. EFFECTS OF WEATHER
Many times small unit planners are prone to disregard the weather. This is particularly true when operating in the Temperate Zones where we do not expend to find extremes in weather conditions. The fallacy of such commissions is clearly demonstrated by this operation. Bitter cold weather and thawing weather was experienced by the 2d Battalion within the short span of 24 hours.
Many of the adverse effects of weather were foreseen and steps taken to adequately cope with them prior to the beginning of this operation. Snow suits were improvised and is- sued. Explosives were made available to all personnel to assist In digging field fortifications. It would have been impossible to dig into the frozen ground during the first day of the attack if ordinary tools had been used. The weasel was provided for supply and evacuation. The main supply road to the battalion was plowed free of snow.
The weather created other problems which were not foreseen and which affected the accomplishment of the battalion mission. The inability of the track laying vehicles, tanks and tank destroyers, to perform at maximum efficiency in the deep snow coupled with the inexperience of these units deprived the 2d Battalion of much needed fire support. The malfunction of small arms and crew served weapons, which was probably due to the coagulation of excessive oil, came as a surprise to the crews manning these weapons. The change from extremely cold to warm weather aggravated trench foot and exposure cases.
From the foregoing observations it can be deduced that weather may have marked effects on the operations of small units.
4. THE ENEMY CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE
Several valuable observations can be made through a study of the results obtained by the German defense of this town. Throughout the entire period of three days it Is noted that at no time did they give up more ground than was absolutely necessary. Their initial MLR was organized well forward and near the line of contact. If superior numbers and fire power forced them to give up one house they withdrew to an adjacent house. During the first night after the beginning of our attack they reinforced their positions and set up two definite lines of resistance while still occupying the houses forward of the first organized line. Their frequent and accurate use of mortar concentrations to break up our attacking formations resulted in numerous delays as well as casualties for the 2d Battalion. The use of machine guns fired by remote control wires and cunningly concealed firing embrasures all aided to confuse and surprise the attackers, thus making them more cautious and less aggressive in their advance.
The one factor missing from this defense which would probably have turned the fight in favor of the Germans was the counterattack. Although various groups of enemy personnel were organized for this mission at no time during the three days of this operation did the enemy launch such an attack against the 2d Battalion. It is not hard to visualize the success which an aggressive counterattacking force would have achieved if it had followed any one of the numerous heavy mortar concentrations laid on the attacking troops.
In spite of this lack of counterattacks the enemy was successful in delaying a battalion for three days when future plans of the attacking force were based on the premise that the town could be taken within five hours.
5. PRE-COMBAT TRAINING OF INFANTRY
The loss of leaders due to battle fatigue as well as losses due to enemy action during this engagement focuses our attention on the thought that improved battle indoctrination is necessary along several lines.
The E Company Commander could not push himself to the extent necessary for a rifle company commander. Here ia a man of unquestioned personal courage who broke down at a critical period during an operation. The need for realistic battle indoctrination is emphasized when we consider that this officer recovered from his initial shook and later became a successful military leader. The platoon sergeant who had led his platoon in an aggressive manner for two days broke down in a matter of seconds and without prior warning that he would do so. It is the writers opinion that the indoctrination given the 2d Battalion was not realistic. This may be said of battle indoctrination in general. There is a natural tendency to shun the distasteful eventualities of combat. It is absolutely necessary that men going into combat be prepared to see their friends killed and mutilated. Furthermore, they must be prepared to give orders which may result in loss of life or injury. This can be accomplished only if a realistic approach is taken to battle indoctrination.
The second factor which must be stressed during pre combat training is that all personnel must be prepared mentally and professionally to take over the duties of their superiors at any time. Although no attempt has been made to account for all the casualties suffered by the 2d Battalion during this action there are enough known or recorded losses to indicate that two company commanders, eight platoon sergeants, three section leaders, eighteen squad leaders, and ten platoon leaders became casualties. During training we very often have "fall out one" days when a platoon leader takes command of the company and so forth down the line. We also conduct crew served weapons drill in the same manner. In many cases this training is done in a perfunctory manner and the real need is never impressed on all personnel until they are faced with a situation such as described herein.
6. THE BATTALION PLAN
Although the Regimental Commander, 311th Infantry announced in his after action observations that the 2d Battalion's plan for the attack on KESTERNICH was faultless the writer believes that this plan could have been simplified in one respect. If the missions of E Company and G Company had been exchanged for the initial attack on 30 January it would have eliminated the necessity of a rather complicated passage of lines which was necessary during the first morning of the attack. During the confusion of battle, company size units should not be burdened with complicated maneuvers if it can be avoided. The more simple a plan becomes the easier it is to execute. While other contributing factors existed it is believed that the momentum of the 2d Battalion attack on the first morning would have been maintained if this exchange of missions had been effected. This change would have allowed both F and E Companies to attack eastward and eliminated the necessity of F Company's turn towards Objective 27 while in contact with the enemy. Such a turn deliberately exposes a flank to the enemy who may be quick to take advantage of such an error. It was impossible for the right platoon of F Company to cross to the north side of the street as planned until the other platoons had advanced enough to relieve the enemy pressure. Actually the turning action developed Into a regrouping of F Company and a change In direction rather than a maneuver which maintained constant pressure on the enemy as visualized in the plan.
7. COORDINATION
The chain of events beginning with the tank destroyer firing Into E Company troops as they cleared the last houses in the triangle on the eastern edge of town leads us to the Important need for coordination on the battlefield. This event was immediately followed by a friendly tank firing on the tank destroyer. While the commanders concerned offered mistaken identity as the excuse for these actions the actual cause of these errors can be laid to the lack of communication between infantry, tanks, and tank destroyers. Three arms operating In one small town were not cognizant of the movements or exact location of each other.